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BOOK REVIEW
Accounting for Family Change
PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW. By June
Carbone. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 341. $49.50
(Hardcover), $18.50 (Paperback).
FROM PARTNERS TO

KATHARINE

B.

SILBAUGH*

The legal focal point of familial obligation in the United States has long been
the relationship between paired adults-most centrally marriage. Obligations to
children, and rights to their company, were derivative; they were to be met
through the framework of the all-important pairing of adults. Over the past
several decades, that core source of legal obligation has shifted from the adult
relationship between partners to the relationship between parent and child. The
shift has occurred at a number of different levels, and it has had a variety of
consequences, the majority of which are still shaking out. The legal catalyst for
this change comes largely from two major doctrinal changes in the law: the
movement to no-fault divorce and the recognition of constitutional rights for
unwed fathers. Numerous cultural and economic factors, the subjects of extensive review in empirical studies, contributed to the change as well.
No-fault divorce and constitutional rights for unwed fathers occurred at the
hands of legal actors with no inkling of the structural reach they would have.
Though the renegotiation of the terms of adult relationships, marked by fewer
obligations, is far underway, the renegotiation of the terms of parental and
societal responsibility for children is still nascent. We can have moments of
insight into the meaning of the shift from partners to parents for a number of
different family policies and legal questions. But we are in the middle of this
change, and thus much about it is still unknown. This is the deceptively simple
thesis of June Carbone's wonderful new book, From Partners to Parents: The
Second Revolution in Family Law.1
My Review suggests the book is entirely descriptive-a review of data and
historical materials, with the goal of reporting what has happened. This is no
accident. Carbone comfortably employs the reporter's voice, dislikes moral
argumentation, and believes that many, or maybe most, arguments can be
resolved with more data. She sets about resolving some of the theoretical views
of the family through the use of data, and she deluges the reader with explanatory empirical nuance from sociologists and historians. Methodologically, it
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. © 2001, Katharine B. Silbaugh. I wish to
thank Brian Bix and Nancy Staudt for their timely and very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000).
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seems that Carbone believes that information can resolve most normative
disputes, a position not unlike the controversial one Richard Posner takes in his
Holmes lectures delivered at the Harvard Law School in 1997.2
From Partnersto Parents is a truly terrific book, and every page is interesting. However, the book has a few difficulties that derive from the same source:
Carbone is not perfectly comfortable making arguments directly. She seems far
more at ease assessing and juxtaposing the works of others (which she does in
an exceedingly fair and careful manner). At the same time, Carbone implicitly
does take a number of normative positions. Her normative or theoretical positions, though, are extremely difficult to excavate from her reportorial style.
Consequently, she seems to have several additional theses-I call them the
book's "additional commitments"-in addition to the one she overtly argues.
Those commitments are, in brief, as follows. First, the modem nuclear family
of the twentieth century, even the 1950s family, is not a stable base. This is a
denaturalizing point: Ever since we moved to companionate families two
hundred years ago, the family has been increasingly unstable. Second, the
isolation of any one variable to explain family change will always give a
misleading story about causes of change. Third, interventions designed to
influence family form will be ineffective. Fourth, moral exhortation and moral
argumentation about the family are ineffective. Fifth, mothers' increased labor
force participation has given women some power and choices that are good and
should be maintained. Sixth, the allocation of caregiving responsibilities to
families is both ineffective and unfair now that mothers and fathers are both
employed, and should be remedied with greater social support for child-rearing.
My three primary issues with the book arise precisely because Carbone does
not argue her additional commitments in any sustained way, but simply suggests
them in single-sentence conclusions to discussions, or in the way she frames her
presentation of data. First, because the additional commitments she seeks to
advance through this text are suggested only, they are not well fleshed out. In
places, they seem to clearly contradict each other. There are two main examples
of seeming contradictions. The first is her view that moral argumentation is
ineffective, combined with her argument that changes in sentiment explain a
substantial amount about family form. The second, and potentially more significant example, is her advocacy of a public role in family policy surrounding
children on the one hand, combined with her view that government interventions to affect family behavior are ineffective.
As for the significance of sentiment versus the significance of moralism,
Carbone holds ideas in potential conflict with respect to the effects of moralistic
argumentation. In several places, she argues that moral exhortation does not
have much effect on family behavior, as there are so many more material factors
that will influence individual choices. At the same time, she argues that often it
2. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1637, 1641

(1998).
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is difficult to use straight economic analysis to account for changes in family
structure because that analysis does not account for changes in sentiment, and
the changes in sentiment will have their own influences. 3 The meaning of
sentiment is never fully developed or distinguished from moralism, though her
use of sentiment suggests it refers to the way family members expect to feel
about one another and their roles in the family. Because neither of these
arguments, about the significant role of sentiment, or about the insignificant role
of moralism, are advanced explicitly as central claims of her book, their
potential discord is never brought to the surface and explored.
Similarly, Carbone's theses are in tension in asserting that government intervention is ineffective, yet that government support for child-rearing is good. She
is committed to demonstrating that government intervention intended to influence family form, such as cuts in welfare intended to decrease single parenting,
will be ineffective. This failure occurs because the influences on family form
evolve over long periods of time, centuries in fact, and are not ever a product of
single variables. This is not to say that influences on family cannot be explained
partially. It is simply to say that given the number of long-term macroeconomic
and cultural influences on the evolution of family form, the design of any
program to change that evolution will never have predictable consequences
when placed in the larger flow of influences. Attitude or ideology-what
Carbone calls "sentiment"-is particularly hard to factor into family change.
That is to say, a major task of this book is to complicate deeply many of the
common explanations for the causes of change in the family, and thereby to
make interventions appear simple-minded. This might seem like the basic
libertarian argument; government intervention is ineffective at best and at worst
hurts the people it is intended to help, or has consequences entirely unexpected
by its designers.
However, another commitment Carbone advances is a commitment to a
different relationship between children and the society at large, represented by
government. That is to say, she would like better public support for childrearing, presumably through programs like public daycare, richer after-school
programs, community centers, and libraries. This commitment appears to come
with a fair dose of intervention into the family-no one could read this book
and describe Carbone as a libertarian. Like Carbone, I support intervention to
create institutional support for raising children. But Carbone's approach to the
3. So, for example, some would argue that the rise in the affectionate family accompanied the
economic shift to industrialization and is explained by that shift. Carbone says it preceded that shift,
and so cannot be explained by it, nor easily explained by any one alternative factor. That shift was one
of sentiment, which in her view defies easy explanation. In addition, we might expect to see changes in
the economy, such as women's increased economic power, lead to more marriages on better terms for
women following a period of marital instability. This is because even on new terms, marriage is still
good for both men and women along various measures. It is good for men psychologically, and good
for both women and men to share the costs of reproductive labor, the theory goes. But sentiment
complicates this trajectory, as attitudes about men and women in marriage will not necessarily change
in the direction predicted by rational choice theory.
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question in this book suffers to some degree from the extent to which Carbone
buries her own arguments. There is tension, if not contradiction, between her
arguments that intervention to influence changes in family form are simpleminded, while intervention to support parenting is worthwhile.
There are arguments that could be made that would reduce these two tensions, 4 but Carbone does not offer any. She cannot, because both parts of her
argument in need of reconciliation are themselves so indirectly made. She
would need to bring those arguments more to the surface, be more direct and
normative about them, to explain why they do not conflict. Reconciling them
would require an admission that she is arguing them at all. Thus my first
problem with the book is the absence of exploration of tensions in her arguments, as they are themselves only indirectly made.
The second question the book raises is whether the neutral presentation of
data, which we can see illuminates normative disputes, can also hide normative
claims. The mechanism Carbone uses for obscuring her normative argument
works as follows: She describes the changes in behaviors among adults as
beyond control, with single parenting and working motherhood upon us unchangeably whether we like it or not-they are facts. While society cannot
change that, it can ease the burdens those changes have imposed on children as
well as parents, through better societal structures for child-rearing in an age of
full employment and minimal marriage security. This would mean active policy
around the unfinished part of the transformation in family life: the one that
remakes relations between family and state. Though she does not address why
she is more optimistic about the possibility of influencing childhood than she is
about adult relations, I am left believing that it is in part because she wants to
influence the quality of childhood more than she wants to influence adult
relationships.
My third issue with the book also arises from one of her buried commitments:
she does not make a normative justification for intervention on behalf of
children. Her advocacy of it is occasional, leaving no single place where the
justifications could have been offered. There are periodic hints at her reasons for
commitment to children: their inherent vulnerability, for example, or the connection between children's dependency and women's inequality. But were her
argument in favor of intervention more explicitly sustained, she would likely
have seen the need for argumentation on behalf of that intervention. At the end
of this Review, I offer an outline of what the normative justification for social
intervention on behalf of children might look like.

4. For example, one might believe that intervention does not change behavior. Therefore, intervention in family form would be pointless if the state is trying to give parents incentives to marry. In the
same vein, intervention to support child-rearing through public childcare would not affect behavior by,
for example, increasing the number of single-parent families; it would only relieve parents' burdens. Or,
for example, one might believe that sentiment is a matter of attitude about one's own behavior, and
moralism is a matter of argumentation about the behavior of others. No such definitional clarity is
offered.

2001]

ACCOUNTING FOR FAMILY CHANGE

I believe that the indirect way in which Carbone makes arguments has
payoffs, however, as it makes some of her arguments harder to resist. For
example, she illustrates the way that, as a result of their increased workforce
participation, women have gained the ability to make more choices-about how
to use their time, and whether, with whom, and for how long they will engage in
intimate relationships. That those gains have wrought instability for children,
then, suggests that we should either seek greater marital stability at the price of
women's independence, or seek to support children in the world of independent
women. Carbone's choice of the latter is ostensibly about efficacy (women will
simply not go back), but its normative content is also evident. By not quite
announcing that she is choosing social support for child-rearing because the
price of a return to stable marriages on the old terms is too high for women, the
book leads the reader to feel that she has reached Carbone's conclusion on her
own. By the end, it seems that it is simply inevitable as a factual matter that
women will not take the old terms of marriage and the old division of labor.
This is so no matter what kind of moral argumentation is made on behalf of
children or marriage. Therefore, better support for working motherhood is
simply sound, sensible intervention on behalf of the vulnerable-children.
Making the changes in women's societal power seem like they are inevitable
facts is a persuasive technique, even if it obscures a normative view about that
change.
Carbone has written what could be three separate books here, each represented by one of her three sections. The first reviews theoretical perspectives on
family form and function. The second reviews both the history of transformations in family form and function, and empirical data on the causes of family
phenomena such as the rise in divorce, the rise in non-marital births, and the
effects on children of single parenting. The third reviews legal doctrine, tracing
the vitiation of responsibility between adults through marriage, and the strengthening of obligations of parents toward children in isolation from the adult
relationship. Only the third section demonstrates in any straightforward way her
overt thesis, which is that we have eliminated responsibilities between partners
and strengthened them between parents and children. The first two sections
make much more sense, however, when viewed in the light of her implicit
additional commitments. If her commitments had been made more explicit, she
might have been able to make her arguments more forcefully and draw the three
sections together more clearly. My minor qualifications here notwithstanding,
what Carbone has achieved is very impressive-almost breathtaking: She has
analyzed the major, and some more tangential, texts about the family from
sociology, history, political theory, legal doctrine, and economics. She has
added tremendous value in her syntheses and leaves the reader with as much to
chew on in 241 pages as one expects from three books. If my complaints stem
from the amount of material she has bitten off, and the inevitable difficulty in
creating a single, holistic argument out of that material, it is the kind of
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complaint any author should be proud to have generated. For the family law or
legal feminism scholar, this is a must read.
In this Review, I canvass in some detail the content of Carbone's book.
Throughout, I attempt not only to represent what Carbone has offered us, but to
view her text through the lens of what I believe are some of the alternative
commitments she is seeking in order to advance and to explicate those commitments. I will try to show when she is using data to illuminate normative
disputes, but also where I think she is using data to obscure them. This is an
extraordinarily rich text, and it is important to understand what the book does as
well as what it says. To understand what it does, the reader needs both the
cumulative effect, and a sense of the ratio between information and argument,
with relatively more of the former. When she does make her own arguments,
she sometimes does so through the voice of the theorist or analyst with whom
she most agrees, rather than overtly, making it seem that even more of the book
is simple reporting than is actually the case.
I.

CARBONE's ARGUMENT AND EVIDENCE

From Partners to Parents is divided into three sections: one on dominant
theoretical approaches to the family, one on empirical data, and one on contemporary legal doctrine and debates. This Part surveys each of the three sections in
turn.
A.

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE ON LAW AND THE NATURE OF THE FAMILY

Recognizing that it would be impossible to cover everyone's theory of the
family, Carbone chooses four representative theorists: Gary Becker, Martha
Fineman, Susan Moller Okin, and William Galston. She chooses very wisely. It
is true that there are important perspectives on the family not covered by these
theorists; for example, none have a deeply religious or conventionally moralistic
sense of family obligation, 5 and none have a particularly nuanced story to tell
about the multiplicity of possible family forms, informed either by class,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation.6 Nonetheless, her four choices, as she ably
demonstrates, represent key "comers of the debate."7 First, they tell us the
assumptions that are at play in family policy debates-things in the theories of
5. For example, I suspect the Promise Keepers, William Kristol, and the Southern Baptists would not
feel that their theoretical perspective on the function of the family is represented by these four corners.
The latter two examples of moralists about family form and behavior are Carbone's own. CARBONE,
supra note 1, at 234.
6. For example, Katherine Franke's historical work on the multiplicity of intimate arrangements in
the Reconstruction-era South among former slaves suggests a different value than any of these
theorists: that of creative arrangements that go beyond two-parent or parent-child alignments, with
implications for the narrowing effect of legalized marriage both after the Civil War and in today's
same-sex marriage debate. Katherine Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 252 (1999); see Martha Ertman, Marriage
as a Trade: Debunking the Private-PrivateDistinction, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 29 (2001).
7. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 1.
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each that require an empirical guess. This is an important set up for the second
section of her book, where she carefully canvasses what we do know about
those empirical questions. More significantly, the four do not simply have
different theories about the best family structure and how it ought to be
achieved; they have different values that they think should govern the question
of family policy. Those values need to be evaluated and squared with the values
of the society at large, which Carbone tries to excavate from social practices
and conduct in her second and third sections. Carbone argues that two questions
are key to theoretical divides about family policy: (1) "Should provision for
family caretaking involve egalitarian roles or specialized ones?" and (2) "Should
the two-parent family be seen as essential or as an optional element in family
well-being?" 8
1. The Theories of Gary Becker
For Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker, the family's central virtue
is the specialization of labor, which creates efficiencies that increase overall
wealth. 9 In the nuclear marital family, the best way to maximize everyone's
wealth will be for one spouse to work in the paid labor force and the other to
specialize in "household production." Becker controversially adds that women
have a biologically based comparative advantage at the latter, and that this
sexual division of labor is cross-culturally universal.1 ° However, Becker further
says that one needs the right institutional structures to encourage specialization
and get that most efficient family form. How well this form functions depends
in part on neither party to the marriage being able to abscond with all the gains
from specialization, as might occur if a man left a marriage with his earning
capacity after his wife had put years of household labor into raising their
children." To decide to specialize, both parties must trust that they will reap the
benefits of the efficiencies that come from specialization. Becker argues that as
women's earning power in the labor market increases, and their alternatives to
the wealth produced through the specialized family improve somewhat, the
benefits of marriage (greater wealth through specialization) recede somewhat
for both men and women and thus divorce becomes more likely.
3
2
Legal scholars, including Lloyd Cohen, Allen Parkman,1 and Ira Ellman,1
have tweaked this formulation to identify the legal rules that make trust in the
specialization arrangement stronger or weaker, translating into greater or lesser
8. Id.
9. See generally GARY S.

10.

CARBONE,

BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY

(1981).

supra note 1, at 6.

I1.See Lloyd Cohen, Divorce and Quasi Rents: Or, I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life, 16 J.
STUD. 267 (1987), for a well-known elucidation of this problem.
12. ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 31 (1992).
13. Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1989). Ellman may no longer
be quite as sanguine about role division as Carbone represents him to be. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce
Rates, MarriageRates, and the Problematic Persistenceof TraditionalMarital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2
(2000).
LEGAL
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willingness of women, in particular, to engage in it. Parkman argues that the
problem is no-fault divorce, which allows unilateral breach of the implicit deal
embedded in the specialized work roles of marriage. He favors restrictions on
no-fault divorce to encourage greater reliance on the efficient specialized family
form. Ellman argues that divorce should be easy to get, but that payments
should be guaranteed from one spouse to the other at divorce that allow spouses
to specialize without fear of economic disaster upon divorce. Parkman and
Ellman both align with Becker's notion that specialization of labor within the
family is a good, and that legal rules should encourage it.
Carbone, for her part, thinks Becker got it wrong on the meaning of specialization. 14 She sides with David Friedman, 15 who says that household labor is
relatively unspecialized work. When women enter the labor force, any loss in
wealth associated with lesser specialization within the family is more than made
up for in the greater specialization women achieve by developing market skills.
In other words, market work is niot monolithic, and involves a level of specialization of labor for everyone in it that far exceeds the specialization of the
stay-at-home mom. The market/non-market specialization is a relatively dull
tool for explaining what specialization actually looks like among workers of all
kinds.
Carbone does not go the one step further. She might have noted that specialization among women in different forms of market labor brings a new, hierarchical
form of specialization among women around care work. Middle-class women
are now in the paid labor force, and their children are cared for by women
almost invariably of lower economic status. The process has turned care work
into truly specialized labor-specialized among women who have little economic power and who receive very low wages for their work. The wage
structure is in part determined by the need for parents to afford child care out of
parents' wages, more than it is a reflection of the work's value to the parents.
The way Becker analyzes the gains from specialization of labor, it would seem
that we have achieved even more gains through greater specialization. Many
feminists, probably Carbone included, would question the nature of those gains
either for parents or for the new class of paid caregivers. Were caregiving wages
not paid solely by parents, the negative effects of this specialization for paid
caregivers might be alleviated somewhat. This might be an additional justification for public support of caregiving.
2. The Theories of Susan Moller Okin
Susan Moller Okin is a political scientist, and her concern is justice, not
efficiency.' 6 She argues that by any conventional philosophical measure of

14. See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change and Divorce Reform, 65 TuLANE L. REv. 953, 991 (1991).
15. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 59"6-97 (2d ed. 1990).
16. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND ThE FAMILY 7-8 (1989).
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justice, the family is unjust. The family she describes is the same one that
Becker describes: there is specialization-meaning sex-based division of laborand there is economic dependence for women. Okin argues that because women's position makes them less able to leave a marriage than does men's, they
have a concomitant lesser voice within the ongoing marriage, as the strength of
one's exit strategy correlates positively with the strength of one's bargaining
position. Inability to bargain within marriage means inability to redistribute
reproductive labor, reinforcing the roles. Power difference, then, is a major
component of specialization. Says Carbone, Okin's analysis shows "just how
bad a deal traditional marriage has been for women."' 7 This point is supported
by the fact that it is women, especially young women, who seek divorce more
often than do men. The only road to justice, to equalizing the impact of current
specialization, is to equalize roles between men and women in the market and in
the family. Because marriage can be hard on women, that equal sharing can
*happen post-divorce as well, with equal parental involvement.
Carbone points out the similar ways that Becker and Okin see the same
family (specialization and women's dependence), and the same threat to its
breakdown: women's greater economic opportunity in the market. Becker describes reduced gains from marriage as a result: With women and men no longer
"specialized," marriage is not as efficient, and so fewer will want it. But for
Okin,that is the same thing as better alternatives. Maybe, Carbone suggests, the
rise in the divorce rate is only a temporary condition, while the terms and
expectations of the marriage deal are renegotiated in light of women's greater
bargaining power. Maybe it is not something to worry about (were one inclined
to worry in any case) because society will in time have more, and substantively
conducted on different terms, where women have more
better, marriages,
8
influence.'
Carbone has her doubts. She argues that relative power is not the only thing
that affects attitudes toward marriage. Here, she complicates these economic
and bargaining power-based arguments with the problem of cultural expectations and their seeming failure to follow rational-actor models directly.' 9 This is
an early reference to the problem of "sentiment," which she will explore in
greater detail later.

17. CARBONE, supra note 1,at 17.
18. See id at 18.
19. She mentions Victor Fuchs's response to these issues: Women will have a hard time redistributing reproductive work as long as they care more about that work. VIcrOR R. FucHs, WOMEN'S QuEST FOR
ECONOMIC EQUALrrY 67-73 (1988). Carbone cites Fuchs in the same way she cites David Friedman on
the meaning of specialization: She moves from reporting on the theories of all of those in the debate, to
approvingly citing these two. This will be one of the only ways Carbone's own views come through the
careful and fair-minded reporting of the debates among other scholars. At times, this way of showing
her hand is unsatisfying, as she does not then feel the need to defend their arguments against the way
her main theorists would respond. In other words, she does not say how Becker would respond to
Friedman, or how Okin would respond to Fuchs. See CARBONE, supra note 1, at 19.
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3. The Theories of Martha Albertson Fineman
Martha Fineman thinks Okin and Becker are asking the wrong questions.
They are both concerned with the relationship between spouses. Becker believes
the function of the family is specialization, and its concomitant wealth creation.
Okin thinks equality is the goal-justice between the sexes the problem.
Fineman, on the other hand, is concerned with provisioning.20 In other words,
Fineman believes that the relationship between adults is not important because
neither specialization nor equality between the sexes is the function of the
family. Rather, the function of the family is to provide care to dependents and
their caregivers. Following from this function, the legal response to the family,
says Fineman, should be reorganized around the caregiver-dependent dyad
(mother-child), 2 1 not the adult, traditionally spousal, relationship. In addition,
Fineman argues that this caregiving is important societal work (in economist's
terms, has positive externalities), and it is unjust to allocate it solely, to the

family. She sees the source of women's disadvantage rooted in society's allocation of responsibility for care to the nuclear family, not in imbalance of
caregiving workloads between the sexes. This allocation of care to the family
creates women's dependence on men, and subjects them to male control.
Therefore, she is concerned primarily with a reorientation of the relationship
between family and state that could lead to better and more just provision for
dependents. She seeks more financial support for caregiving work, more "subsidy," which she justifies with the argument that we all lead subsidized lives.2 2
Carbone gently notes that Fineman's policy descriptions of the form that
government support for care would take are thin. Ironically, we will eventually
find that differently stated, Carbone agrees with Fineman's sense of family
purpose and the proper relationship between society and family to a large
extent. Carbone also wants a better public infrastructure to support the care
work of families. And like Fineman, Carbone is weak in the area of institutional
design. Agreeing with both of them, and offering none myself, I must conclude
that it is time for serious attention to the issue of institutional design of public
support for caregiving.
4. The Theories of William Galston
William Galston was President Clinton's domestic policy adviser when Clinton first took office.2 3 His is an empirical claim: On many measures of child

20.

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENnETH

(1995).
21. Fineman calls this the mother-child dyad, in order to prevent the obfuscation of who does
caregiving work most of the time, but then she allows men who mother to be situated in a dyad with
their charges as well.
22. Fineman does not particularly dare whether children are raised in two-parent households.
23. Galston came from academics, is a political theorist, and is active in the communitarian
movement. In Liberal Purposes,he argues that the promotion of virtue is a legitimate goal of the state.
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 304
CENTURY TRAGEDIES
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welfare, children raised in two-parent households do better than those raised in
single-parent households. 24 Therefore, says Galston, we should seek to encourage two-parent families. He proposes braking mechanisms on divorce to achieve
this goal, in the form of waiting periods. He also favors policies aimed at
discouraging non-marital births.
However, Galston has no particular account of how the better outcomes for
children are produced. He does not care whether the two-parent households
specialize (Becker) or are egalitarian (Okin), because he does not try to demonstrate whether one or the other model is causally related to the better outcomes
associated with two-parent households. Moreover, his braking mechanisms
would only apply to marriages with young children; he does not care whether
there is divorce on its own basis, but only for the sake of the children.25 He does
not appear to have a theory about what the two-parent family does for parents,
or an apparent interest in what it may cost parents. The former is Becker's
province, the latter Okin's.
In a chapter entitled, "What Is the Purpose of Family Policy?" Carbone points
out that Galston's view of the function of the family is most similar to
Fineman's. They argue that family policy should be about provisioning for
children. Their differences are over what produces the best provisioning: Fineman says more societal support, and Galston says two parents. But Galston
would seemingly change his mind if the data on outcomes were different.
Fineman, on the other hand, would argue the data on outcomes would be
different were there more public support for single parenting. Carbone wisely
states this dilemma by asking whether we support two-parent families because
they work, or whether instead they work because we support them.26 Galston
acknowledges that the state can only have a limited effect on the rise in single
parenting. This appears to strengthen Fineman's claim: If you cannot force
biological parents to raise children together, your concern for child welfare
should lead you to make two-parent families less determinative of a child's
well-being.
Carbone shows us the extent to which the two have a largely empirical
dispute. She argues that "Galston's problem is that it is difficult to link statistics

(1991). To avoid liberal problems with coercion of individuals, however, the promotion of virtue should
happen through promotion of the institutions that can foster virtue: churches, schools, and families, for
example. Families are the best way to instill the virtues in the children who will become adults. And in
Galston's view, the two-parent family is the institution best able to handle the task. William A.
Galston, A Liberal Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 14
(1990-91).
24. Carbone will later review the empirical research at length, in a way that confirms that Galston's
claim has a basis in fact. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 43-46.
25. In other words, for Galston, marriage is instrumental as a means to good child welfare; it is not
instrumental for the spouses themselves-as it is to Becker--or a site of more or less just relations-as
it is for Okin. Galston does not appear to have a theory beyond child outcomes supporting the
two-parent family.
26. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 51.
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on the negative outcomes associated with non-marital births to moral exhortation."2 7 What may be good for the average child is not necessarily good for
every child, and so moral disapproval of an individual's single parenting
choices cannot be right on its own. This turns out to be very important to
Carbone, who returns repeatedly to the paradigm (fictional) case of Murphy
Brown, a wealthy woman who, on her own, does have the financial resources of
many two-parent families. Carbone's point is that even if two parents on
average are better for kids, in Murphy Brown's case that cannot become a moral
requirement to elect abortion or adoption. Carbone seems to agree with Fineman and Galston about the function of family policy (commitment to children),
not with Becker or Okin (appropriate distribution of labor between adults). She
sees this value as the starting point for rewriting "a code of parental conduct
capable of bridging [the] deep disagreements '' 8 about moral judgment of
personal choices. She sees moral exhortation as useless-at one point, she says
so clearly: "At some point, it simply becomes impossible to go back.",29 Note
here that Carbone is not simply saying she does not like moralism. Rather, she
is saying it is ineffective. 3 °
Rewriting a code of parental conduct is an inspiring promise. But Carbone's
strength is in painting a rich description both of other people's work, and of the
world we live in. That is a big enough task for any one book, and she does not
in this book attempt a thorough exposition of that new code of parental conduct.
5. Carbone's Conclusions About the Four Theoretical Debates
Carbone provides readers a chart through which to review the four theoretical
debates. 31 Becker favors both the two-parent family and specialization of labor.
Fineman favors the specialization of labor, but is agnostic about family form.
Galston favors the two-parent family, but is agnostic about specialization. And
Okin favors egalitarian roles, irrespective of family structure. Becker believes
the main bonus of the family is the efficiency of specialization, which does
make women vulnerable and so they will not agree to it without marriage.
Fineman believes the main function of the family is the care provided by
caregivers to their charges. Galston believes that is the main function of the
family as well, but he also believes that it is dependent on a two-parent
structure. And Okin believes that parents, married or divorced, are a benefit to
one another as people between whom reproductive labor can be spread evenly;
the family is a potential source of egalitarian labor that could promote just and
egalitarian gender roles.

27. Id. at 46.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Id. at 53.
30. This is difficult to reconcile, however, with Carbone's acknowledgement that changes in
sentiment do not track economics in a straightforward way, and must be explained on their own terms.
31. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 49.
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Carbone says that Becker's economic analysis is in need of updating. Because women's workforce participation actually leads to greater specialization
among women, the greater specialization increases overall wealth and, in
addition, gives women more power. This increases women's ability to choose
family forms, including more egalitarian marriages or remaining single. Though
she is descriptive here, from the presentation, she seems to be in favor of these
changes.
But Carbone finally adds that women's increased market power does not
necessarily lead inexorably to more egalitarian marriages; rather, many cultural
forces influence men's and women's changing attitudes toward marriage. After
such precise discussions of incentive effects and bargaining power, Carbone
concludes that culture turns out to be too complicated to make the kind of
economically modeled predictions that the preceding analysis would suggest.
This is a key theme continuing throughout the book, as she asks how we
account for changes in "sentiment."
B. FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE EMPIRICAL DEBATE

Through her survey of social, economic, and legal theory, Carbone has laid
good groundwork for her empirical section. In this section, she gives the reader
plenty to chew on in any attempt to evaluate the effects of AFDC, divorce,
women's greater economic power, or single parenting. She heroically wades
through and simplifies complicated empirical questions. One might expect a
section entitled "The Empirical Debate" to be primarily about social science
data. But she does more here. She also encourages the reader to think about
changes in "sentiment." Her chapter titles include questions like "What Did
Happen? ' 32 which she answers with traditional historical materials that give
both more and less than traditional social science data. Because her thesis is that
those changes are not easy to account for precisely, the materials she offers to
elucidate the problem, while fascinating, are inconclusive. This aspect of her
empirical section is brave and mature, as she accepts the power of empirical
data, and at the same time presents histories in the particularities that seem to
derail any straight economic account of family change. She accepts the inconclusiveness and yet insists that the details be examined. One of her final chapters in
this section is entitled, "Economics and History: The Chapter Yet to Be Written,"33 and this intersection of disciplines is the most promising aspect of her
book. If she does not herself fully write that "chapter yet to be written," it is
hard to fault her after she shows how difficult it is to draw the two together and
create an accurate account even of the past, much less of the present.
Carbone's introduction to the "empirical" section begins with her conviction
that "the family is the product of historical forces, however much we continue

32. Id. at 85.
33. Id. at 98.
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to debate just which historical forces. 34 She reminds us that concern about an
increase in family instability is a staple of American history. In the nineteenth
century, we heard that divorce rates were rising too fast, "women had become
too independent, men too unreliable, and children were suffering. '35 And she
points out that these nineteenth-century analysts were right, the family was
changing and did change, and we no longer think it makes sense to ask whether
that change was good or bad-we have internalized it into our family norms.
The value of Carbone's insight is that in reviewing family change, we must
never think we know what the baseline is from which change occurred-when,
in a sense, "Time One" was. The 1950s family that many implicitly use as the
baseline today was itself once radical and decried as dangerous to the society's
moral fiber, with spouses choosing one another for love and with apparent
disregard for parental approval and obligation toward the family of origin or
larger community. In that light, our period fits smoothly on a graph of increasing family instability over centuries, rather than representing a sharp spike in a
long-stable institution. This is the highly effective, if never explicitly announced, big-picture function of Carbone's historical analysis.
1. Stone and Franklin: A Historical Account of Family Change
Carbone begins with two long chapters, one on "History and the Making of
the Modern Family ' 36 (which is largely about changes in English family life),
and the next on the particular history of the African-American family. These
chapters attempt to sort out massive literatures and historical debates in each
area. They give far more information than is necessary to demonstrate any of
the points she might be offering them to prove, and in the midst of reading
them, one is both fascinated by their richness and at the same time befuddled by
their relationship to her partners-to-parents thesis. The chapters appear to
constitute a long proof of some of the following points: (1) the history of the
family is a history of change; (2) mythologies have developed about the natural
state of the family, either African-American or European-American, which
influence policy discourse yet have questionable basis in history; (3) a straight
economic account of the function of the family of the sort Friedrich Engels
offered cannot account for the changes in culture and sentiment that influence
our expectations of family today; and (4) our ability, judged by historical
precedent, to influence family behavior even if we agreed on family form, is
very limited. She does not organize these points, however, or focus on an
explicit payoff of the history section. They must be excavated from the separate
corners where she has hidden them.3 7
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Nonetheless, the history chapters are fascinating in their own right. These chapters can stand
alone as literature reviews on the topic, and also serve to illuminate Carbone's arguments with only
minimal reader extrapolation.
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Carbone's first historical exploration recites Engels s38 account of the family.
The family evolved in response to the economy, from hunter-gatherer culture
with group marriage, to early stages of farming and sometimes temporary
pair-bonding and matrilineal descent, to the period of industry, accumulated
wealth, monogamy, and patrilineal descent. After explaining the Engels thesis,
Carbone lets us know that Engels may have given a decent commentary on
patriarchy, but he did not give us anything like accurate anthropology or history.
It turns out there was not a universal, cross-cultural family form, and form was
not quite tied to economics or industrialization. Carbone says now that "generali39
zations are suspect.",
In her characteristic style, Carbone then elaborates on the work of one scholar
whose work she particularly admires, who is offered up in response to the
weaknesses of the preceding ones. For European history, that scholar is Lawrence Stone.4 ° He makes the important question the change from an authoritarian distance among family members and a family embedded in community
expectations to a warmer "affective individualism" among family members late
in the eighteenth century, coupled with more privacy from community and
kinship networks. Stone argues that economic determinism of Engels's sort
cannot explain this change, occurring as it did before industrialization. The new
family would be recognizable as the Victorian family, the precursor to our
modern family. Its characteristics included the nuclear family in greater isolation from kinship networks; marriage based on love and consent, not familial
arrangement; separate spheres and women's removal from market production,
causing a rise in their economic dependence; fewer children per family with
greater emotional and educational investment in each child; and pleasure as an
acceptable purpose of sex within marriage. Stone is important to Carbone
precisely because he describes changes in affect and attitude, and argues that
they cannot be cleanly linked to economic conditions. This will eventually be
rallied to support her implicit point that family structure is harder to influence
with family policy focused on changing economic incentives than some might
suppose.
Carbone next impressively wades into the historical literature on the development of the African-American family. She presents the work of early scholars in
the field, in particular W.E.B. DuBois 4 1 and E. Franklin Frazier.4 2 Their key
focus was on differentiation among African-American families informed by
38. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 51 (1891).

39. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 57. Many historians, whose theories Carbone details, came along to
complicate Engels's story of family life between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading to the
conclusion that local stories about family form can be pieced together, but that the monogamous
nuclear family was a distinctive feature of northwestern Europe. Id. at 59.
46. See generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1.800 (1977).
41. See generally W.E.B. DuBois, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY (1889).
42. See generally E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES (1939). Carbone

notes that both DuBois and Frazier managed to overcome much of the racist sociology about the
African-American family. Without claiming that they were right in every historical detail they provided,
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class differences. Frazier's conclusion was that African Americans demonstrated the same marital mores as the rest of the culture when they came from a
class that had achieved economic competency. 43 In fact, later historians would
conclude that to the extent instability characterized the African-American family, it was not related to slavery as some speculated, but a twentieth century
development."
Carbone next talks about "the Moynihan Report."45 It was published in 1965,
with the argument that there was a recent dramatic increase in single-parent,
female-headed Black households, and that this family breakdown had led to an
increase in welfare dependency. Carbone reminds us that the data Moynihan
used to describe the Black family in 1965 now describes white American
families, suggesting that the African-American family is simply the first to feel
the impact of changes in the economy and the culture.
Carbone eventually picks the scholar whom she will implicitly back to
46
dispute Moynihan's much-discredited historical account: Donna Franklin.
Franklin's argument, in brief, is that it was the African-American movement to
the North and the greater economic opportunities for women in the North in
domestic work relative to men's opportunities in the North that led to family
instability.47 Men's jobs were more subject to seasonal layoffs, whereas there
was a steady demand for Black female workers. The original rise in femaleheaded households resulted from paternal desertion. In describing today's AfricanAmerican families, Franklin makes the same class distinctions that William
Julius Wilson makes, 48 between middle-class Blacks and Blacks living in urban
poverty, and talks about the latter as having the characteristics of the underclass,
not of their race in particular.49 Franklin notes that birth rates differed for
Blacks based on class, as did family stability in general. While Franklin is not
critical of the urban poor for the adaptations that have occurred as a result of
isolation and unemployment, she nonetheless sees the changes as negative ones

Carbone wants to recognize that they set a standard when insisting that class difference must play an
important role in any serious study of the African-American family. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 13.
43. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 68.
44. Carbone argues that this insight makes irrelevant any attempts to connect African-American
family patterns to actual African culture. That not withstanding, she does spend a few pages elucidating
the accounts by historians who have attempted to make that link. Id. at 72.
45. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 1965).
46. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 69-84.
47. DONNA FRANKLIN, ENSURING INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICANAMERICAN FAMILY 39 (1997).
48. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
49. Like Wilson, Franklin believes the patterns of the urban underclass should not be glorified.
However, Franklin diverges from Wilson by showing more concern for women in urban poverty,
compared with Wilson's overwhelming focus on Black-male joblessness. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 84.
See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR
(1996).
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from an equality standpoint. 50 It is fair to say that this is probably Carbone's
position as well, so sympathetically is Franklin reported.
2. Carbone's Payoff from History
Carbone links the chapters on Stone and Franklin together in an interesting
way. If Franklin chronicles the breakdown of family under modernity in a way
that is now affecting white families just as it has African-American families,
perhaps the real roots of that change are in the transition to the nuclear family
itself chronicled by Stone. Family ties became more intense when larger
community ties broke down. Marriages had to carry more emotional and sexual
commitment. With families now at the center of social organization, they will
often break under the weight of expectations, because of their inability to meet
all the needs now allocated to them. Carbone is trying to demonstrate that
Becker's specialized nuclear family is inherently unstable-it is more fragile
than the less specialized family of the pre-industrial era. 51 Here we see a payoff
for the long engagement with historical trends in the family: Carbone wants us
to denaturalize our notions of the 1950s family, and particularly our notion that
present-day family instability is a departure from that norm. Her point is that the
1950s family had an unstable structure to begin with, particularly when compared with families of earlier eras. Moreover, divorce rates rose steadily throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She has been very effective here at
placing the change in family structure between the 1950s and today on a much
longer spectrum of change, and in the process refocused our sense of the causes
of that change.52 Carbone also wants us to see that it is difficult to assess
changes that are happening as they happen.
In the long view, the cause of divorce, then, is the affectionate nuclear family
itself. Stephanie Coontz has made a very particular argument about the exceptionalism of the 1950s family. 53 Far from being the naturalized norm from which
we evaluate family change, Coontz argues that it is the 1950s that were strange.
Its family practices were a product of younger marriages brought on by a rise in
premarital sex (followed by shotgun marriages). Those marriages, contracted at
a young age and not perfectly voluntarily, turned out to be reasonably unstable,
leading to an increase in the divorce rate when those couples experienced empty
nests-which happened at a younger age for them because they had children so
early in their marriages. Here is one of Carbone's moments of focusing on
50. Franklin attributes some of the difference between Black and white single parenting to different
adoption practices. Between 1940 and 1960, nonmarital birthrates for both Blacks and whites rose
dramatically. However, seventy percent of white mothers placed those babies up for adoption, while
only three to five percent of African-American mothers did. Some of this resulted from racism in social
service agencies. FRANKLIN, supra note 47, at 138; see CARBONE, supra note 1, at 79.
51. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 86.
52. The expectation of affection within marriage-a part of changed sentiment-seems to be a major
structural element of its instability.
53. STEPHANIE CooNrz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP
25-29 (1992).
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sentiment: Coontz argues that sentiment followed social practices, rather than
driving social practices. As divorce became more common, it also became more
accepted. Ideology and attitude followed conduct. Coontz says the same is true
of women's greater workforce participation: it preceded the modem women's
movement, and presumably itself helped create a change in attitudes.
Carbone likes these points because they support her implicit argument that
change in attitudes, or moral exhortation, is not going to change conduct; it will
instead follow conduct. That which does change conduct, it seems, will be an
extremely complicated mix of social and economic factors whose effect is
probably impossible to grasp until social practices, and attitudes, have already
changed. This will later support her general policy approach: we should figure
out ways to support those changes that have taken place, with, for example,
better care systems, rather than attempt to intervene to steer family structure
itself. The argument seems to be one about efficacy, and Carbone seems to be
making the case that it may be impossible to intervene effectively on family
form. But in her circumspect style, she does not quite say all this directly,
preferring to let the empirical data and historical accounts speak for themselves.54
Coontz gives us an account of the 1950s family that is dependent on changed
premarital sexual behavior leading to increased shotgun marriages, and their
fallout. Divorce rates, then, are her focus. But how can we explain the rise in
nonmarital births over the past generation? Carbone looks at some of the
explanations that have been offered. Economists George Akerloff, Janet Yellin,
and Michael Katz argue that with the new widespread availability of contraception and abortion in the 1960s and 1970s, non-marital sexual relations no longer
carried with them Coontz's implicit promise of marriage when an accidental
pregnancy occurred. 55 While unwanted pregnancies may have been aborted at
that point, wanted ones would simply become single-parent families because the
men will choose not to marry. Those mothers who became single mothers were
self-selected as those who wanted their babies with or without marriage but
could no longer extract a marriage from their sexual partners. William Julius
Wilson sees declining availability of jobs for low-income men as the cause of
the drop in marriage rates.5 6 Charles Murray attributes the rise in nonmarital
births to welfare dependence. 57 Carbone reviews the literature here, and usefully shows that Murray's thesis does not fit the data,5 8 in part because he takes
too isolated a snapshot of both changes in the family practices and in welfare
benefits.

54. At other points, as I have argued, Carbone makes reference to a new parental "code of conduct"
that we might adopt, muddying a determination of what exactly is changeable and what is not.
55. George Akerloff, Janet Yellin & Michael Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearingin
the United States, It1Q. J. ECON. 277 (1996).
56. See generally WILSON, supra note 48.
57. CHARLES MURRAY,LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 18 (1994).
58. Carbone notes that Wilson's thesis does not fit the data either.
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Carbone has a larger, and very effective point here. She is trying to complicate claims made by social scientists that theories of cause can be tested against
a simple data set. Carbone notes that without the long view of changes over the
course of centuries in family structure, we can come to believe that isolated
factors have a decisive effect over the course of one generation. We may even
see some support in the statistics for those claims if the statistics are pared down
and isolated enough, but the apparent effects of supposed catalysts and technological shocks become weaker when the changes are plotted over a longer
period of time. The single-variable studies by Wilson, Murray, or Akerloff,
Yellin, and Katz make it seem as though those variables changed in isolation.
Carbone says they change for cultural reasons: birth control is not simply a
technology that fell from the sky, she notes, it was developed in response to a
new demand, putting a feedback loop into the economists' theory. I believe that
Carbone's exit from the problem of the isolated variable is the importance of
sentiment; changes in culture and attitude influenced the existence of the
variables, which then also influenced sentiment. Understanding change, then, is
deeply complicated by how difficult it is to isolate the notion of sentiment.
Here Carbone turns to Milton Regan's Family Law and the Pursuit of
Intimacy.59 She acknowledges that Regan's account is neither a historical
investigation nor an analysis of data along the lines that the prior theorists offer.
Rather, it is an inquiry into sentiment. Regan argues that we have had a cultural
change of sentiment, from a time where identities were more communitarian,
embedded in family relationships, and distinct from the individualism of the
market, to a time where sentiment has families composed of the same kinds of
individuals we see in the market-that is, individuals in pursuit of their own
self-interest and self-definition. Where the sentiment around the separate spheres,
the intimate family, required a boundary between market and family, that
boundary has eroded. We now have e-mail and fax machines at home, market
provision of caregiving and market-prepared dinners. The home is just one
place where individuals pursue their identities, not distinct in quality from other
places. This change in sentiment has implications for intimate commitments:
they are only significant as long as they are useful. That is the kind of change in
sentiment that Carbone believes, combined with all of the concrete technological (birth control) and economic (welfare, joblessness) influences, might begin
to provide an explanation for the increase of single-parent families. The important point for Carbone is that without the change in sentiment, the other factors
do not have full explanatory force, and the change in sentiment is itself
multi-factorial and elusive to explain.6 °

59. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993).
60. Regan announces that there has been a change in sentiment, and his description of the new and
the old sentiment has some intuitive appeal. However, Regan does not actually explain how the change
came about either. Thus, we are left with the understanding that changes in sentiment are significant,
but still do not know what changes sentiment.
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3. The Effect of Single Parenting on Child Welfare
Carbone begins with what has become a commonplace in family policy:
"[O]ver the last several decades, every measure of childhood well-being from
SAT scores to gum-chewing has registered a decline-and the declines correlate
with the rise of single parent families.",6 1 However, this correlation does not
speak for itself, and analyzing it is difficult empirically and politically. She
dispenses up front with the idea that it could be the absence of the parent itself
that explains this result. Children who have lost a parent to death do almost as
well as children with two parents, with children of divorce doing worse, and
children whose parents never married doing the worst of all. Galston, then was
wrong not to figure out why two-parent families are better.
As business-like as Carbone's dismissal of one possible explanation for the
correlation between single-parenting and child welfare is, it should cause the
reader serious pause. If the benefit of two parents is not the presence of both
parents, we have already moved a long way into Fineman's world. There is
some structural benefit to having two parents around, and it appears it is not
necessary to have two parents to deliver that benefit, because kids with a
deceased parent still receive it. The benefit, then, has simply been tied to the
presence of two parents for many families. We can therefore, as Fineman does,
attack the justice of that tying, particularly where it comes at the expense of
women's equality, happiness, or well-being.
Carbone reports out the conclusions of the "leading voice" analyzing the
connection between single parenting and childhood well-being: Sara McLanahan, a sociologist. 62 McLanahan has proved to Carbone her bona fides because
both conservatives and liberals find something to like and something to dislike
in her work. She should be particularly comforting to those who believe that
single parenting is itself the cause of childhood trouble, because she began her
research with a mind toward disproving that thesis, and later became convinced
she needed to accept it in part. She went about controlling for the main factors
that liberals argue are the real cause of the link between single parenting and
child outcomes: race, poverty, and income status. She does tie about half of
these children's disadvantage to income status. It is not just low income, but
loss of income status that produces the effect after divorce.
But this cannot explain why children in step families do worse than those in
two-parent families. McLanahan then adds, to the dismay of liberals, that there
is a "parenting" difference between two-parent and single-parent families. She
admits that she is not as confident about her conclusion here, but she argues that
single-parent households provide less stable personnel, and thus more uncertainty about adult responsibility and rules.63 Residential mobility creates less

61. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 111.
62. See generally SARA S. McLANARAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARETr:
WHAT HELPs, WHAT HURTS (1994).
63. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 113.
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stable communities in single-parent households as well. McLanahan's thesis
conflicts directly with Fineman, as McLanahan would use child support and
other family policies to link children with their fathers, rather than providing
better support to mothers to make single parenting less treacherous. Carbone
lets us know that other researchers have complicated McLanahan's account of
parenting differences with studies suggesting that the sub-standard parenting
begins pre-divorce with families still intact but stressed by conflict, and may
continue post-divorce for a limited, definite term, as parents adjust to single
status. 64
Carbone then takes to task the fatherhood advocates who say that McLanahan
has not gone far enough in linking bad childhood outcomes to the absence of
fathers per se. Fatherhood advocates like David Blankenhorn argue that fathers
are unique and different as parents from mothers, and offer data on the negative
effect of the absence of fathers.6 5 Carbone is decisive in resolving this one,
saying that the empirical data support McLanahan's notion that singleness leads
to certain kinds of instability that is bad for kids, but the data cannot support the
notion that the problem is the absence of fathers.66 Carbone then offers up 6 a7
positive role fathers can play, combining insights offered by Michael Lamb
and Nancy Dowd.6 8 Carbone suggests that there is evidence that fathers can be
effective only when they have a low-conflict, cooperative relationship with the
mother, when the mother welcomes their involvement, and when they support
and admire the mother.
Carbone seems to be suggesting that the benefits that go to the children of
parents who stay together only do so because those parents want to stay
together, and would not run to children of parents who only stay together
because they cannot split. Again, Carbone finds herself concluding that while
these effects may exist, there is nothing family policy can do about them, as
coercing the family structure would not work. Carbone will, at the end of the
book, advocate the encouragement of cooperation between parents, whether
married or divorced. She offers no program to produce that result, and given
that the reform plan might be characterized as one of reforming sentiment, that
should be no surprise, as Carbone has already demonstrated how hard it is to
map out changes of sentiment. She has nonetheless usefully focused the question of harm to children away from family form itself and toward parental
behavior and attitudes.

64. E.g., PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK 71-73 (1997); cf.Andrew Cherlin, P.
Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Christine McRae, Effects of ParentalDivorce on Mental Health Through
the Life Course, 63 Am.Soc. REV. 239, 239-49 (1998).
65. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA (1995).

66. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 116.
67. THE ROLE OF THE FATHER INCHILD DEVELOPMENT (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed. 1997).

68. NANCY DowD, IN DEFENSE OF SNGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997).
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Nonmarital births are not evenly distributed across society. 69 Carbone ends
by gently questioning whether McLanahan's approach, controlling for those
other factors, makes sense. Singleness cannot be isolated as an element if
singleness is itself distributed non-randomly by other socioeconomic factors.
Implicit here is her critique of economic and sociological method: the isolation
of one variable. She seems to prefer the multi-factorial approach of the historian, cautioning against the belief that the isolation of one variable could capture
the causes, and therefore the solutions, to a negative phenomenon.
4. Drawing Together the "Empirical" Section
Carbone now lets readers in more directly on why they have seen sociology
and history so thoroughly entwined in the preceding section. Her claims are as
follows. First, "society's ability to influence family behavior is almost as much
an issue as the content of family values. ' 70 The changing relationship between
family and society has been happening over the course of five hundred years,
and intervention on such evolution is prideful at best.
Carbone finally inserts her own thesis into the section in the following way.
First, she notes that we are now familiar with the transition from the medieval
family, embedded socially and economically in the community, to the Victorian
family, isolated and private. That Victorian family took over the guardianship of
children where the community had previously been in charge, and it was
dependent on role specialization: women's domestic labor. But this family form
was never as universal as the family it replaced, because it could never fully
rely on the community for enforcement of its norms. Rather, the roles had to be
internalized by the individuals, because there was no mechanism for surveillance in the new emotionally bonded family. Full-time mothering helped to
replicate those internalized norms. But "[als a result, the creation and maintenance of the Victorian family was very much a class-based affair."' 7 1 Only the
wealthy and middle class had the resources to keep children at home with a
non-working mother who could provide them with the education, training, and
support that was formerly provided by "the village. 7 2 Thus the poor had lost
the advantages of the community that could provide it with support, but did not
have the resources to avail itself of the new order.
Carbone then argues that we are now in the process of creating a new set of
family strategies, and it too is class based, unavailable to many low-income
families. The middle class may not have ideological agreement about the

69. Nonmarital births occur disproportionately among those already at a disadvantage due to age,
race, and income status. Carbone is arguing that this is not a coincidence: There are more significant
differences between single parents and married parents than their decision to marry or not.
70. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 123.
71. Id. at 124.
72. See generally HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1997). Clinton's book takes its title

from the African proverb: "It takes a village to raise a child."
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family, but says Carbone, there is a coalescence around the behaviors, or
strategies, of the middle class. She lists four components of that new strategy:
(1) Women should invest in their market earning capacity and have children only after they have developed some education and market potential for themselves. Men should notice the earning capacity of women
in addition to other factors in choosing a spouse.
(2) Unmarried women may, like unmarried men, engage in sexual activity,
and consent (not a promise of marriage) is all that is needed to make
that behavior legitimate. Contraception is women's responsibility, but
men are to be financial insurance for unintended births in the form of
child support payers.
(3) Ideal relationships are egalitarian, if not in the exact tasks performed, at
least in that each partner contributes either financially or in caregiving
in a combination best calculated to meet family needs.
(4) Marriage is not a permanent institution.7 3
Carbone notes that these changes offer advantages to those who are able to
implement them (recall that this is a middle class strategy), with diversification
of financial resources and greater potential individual independence upon which
the terms of marriage are negotiated. She also argues that these changes
pertaining to the adult relationship, the move toward a more egalitarian workplace and family, are already substantially underway. We do not know everything we could about them, but society appears to be moving of its own force,
and we will know more as time unfolds. Without saying it, she seems to have
demonstrated that sentiment follows practices: We do not yet agree on a middle
class view of the family, but maybe we will soon because we are coalescing
around a uniform practice.
Carbone again alludes to her dislike of moralism and her posture of reporting
on inevitable changes: "The challenge these changes pose is not the ultimate
one of judgment (the shifts have clearly benefited some and hurt others), but
rather how to rebuild support for families within a structure that requires
managing greater individual freedom within an ever more far-reaching and
complex web of relationships. 7 4 And this is Carbone's critical move. She
maintains throughout the book an attitude about her materials: Changes in
family structure defy intervention and will not respond to incentives, but
support for the new structures is simply good humanitarianism, and there is
room for effective intervention there.
Then she shows us where she is going: All this family realignment has
happened among the adults, but "the transformation that remains incomplete is
73.

CARBONE, supra note

74. Id. at 126.

1, at 125.
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the relationship to children. 7 5 I think what Carbone means by "support" for the
new family is good child policy (an unobjectionable goal). But any optimism
about the possibility of good child policy must assume that there can be
meaningful planned intervention into the new family structure along that axis,
that it will not simply evolve in its own direction without the possibility of
effective intervention. Her posture of optimism toward intervention to support
kids stands in stark contrast to her belief that there is no effective intervention in
the evolution of adult relationships. There may be substantive reasons for the
difference; maybe there is a reason to think intervention into child policy has a
greater likelihood of being effective, or is less likely to be futile, than intervention into adult relationships. Carbone does not offer one. I suspect the real
reason is normative: In Carbone's book, it is less legitimate to intervene in the
evolution of adult relationships than on behalf of children. Thus a judgment that
the new strategy is at least benign if not better seems to slip into the same
section where judgment has been explicitly denied. I am not sure I disagree, but
Carbone has been very social scientific in her posture, thus avoiding the need to
defend this broader normative claim.
She closes this section with discussion of Milton Regan, who believes that
the great virtue of Victorian marriage was the sense of obligation spouses
76
derived from their roles,. eschewing the individualistic pursuit of identity.
Regan organizes this argument around the notion of "status." Carbone finishes
this section by saying that "if Regan is right" that status is the best source of
obligation tying families to communities,7 7 we -should shift our focus from
Regan's notion of the "status" of spouse, to Carbone's notion of the "status" of
parenthood. Her entire normative claim for her different attitude toward intervening in changes in adult relationships and intervening on the parent-child relationship appears in a few paragraphs across two pages:
At a time when intimate relationships may vary widely, parenting involves a
more predictable set of obligations. Marriage may no longer involve dependence; childhood inherently does. The emotional vulnerability of intimate
partners may not rise to the level of societal concern; that of children is more
likely to do so. The obligations of one partner to another ... may be hard to
prescribe between able-bodied adults; the obligations of parents toward their
children are more readily the subject of legal enforcement. 78
It is only slowly that the reader realizes what is remarkable about this
normative turn. Carbone has asserted the conventional liberal wisdom of our
day: We can intervene as a society on behalf of children, but we shy away from
intervention on behalf of adults. She appears to have asserted it without
75. Id. at 127.
76. REGAN, supra note 59, at 28.
77. Her account does not convince me that Regan is right.
78. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 128-29.

2001]

ACCOUNTING FOR FAMILY CHANGE

reflection on its historical contingency--of the changes of sentiment that have
led us to have those attitudes in the late twentieth century. 79 This would not
distinguish her from many who write about the relationship between child and
state. Perhaps her claim for promoting this moral value (child welfare) would
rest on the simple basis of consensus: she is still reporting, but now on the basis
of the common sentiment. But there are those who disagree, or at least feel that
the case needs to be made more affirmatively. I try to sketch what Carbone
could have said about this in Part II.B. of this Review.
Yet Carbone has just spent nearly one hundred pages denaturalizing our
assumptions about the sources of our current understandings of the relationship
between family structure, its change, and forces in the economy and culture.
She seems to make all moral claims suspect at worst, but at least ineffective,
under the weight of historical contingencies. What therefore makes this moment
in her book surprising is that she neither acknowledges that she has made a
normative turn, nor puts it to the kind of testing to which she has subjected
changes in marital structure. One cannot really fault her for this; she has kept
more balls in the air at one time than most legal scholars do. It is simply a
reminder of the impossibility of getting rid of all our prior commitments in
taking a good look at history and data.
This moment in her book may in fact support another one of her key insights:
It is exceedingly hard to get the proper perspective to observe the changes in
attitude and ideology, as well as practices, that are occurring around us. With
respect to the relationship between state, family, and children, she is arguing
that we are very much in the dark as to the reorientation of relationships about
to occur or under way already.
C. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

Carbone takes the third section to map out major shifts in legal doctrine and
argument that have marked recent family relationships. Her time period is much
more limited, with a focus primarily on the last few decades. Her topics, while
wide ranging, all more clearly rally to support her partners-to-parents thesis. In
fact, all the evidence she needs to be extremely persuasive as a descriptive
matter is in these chapters. She allows a chapter each for (1) arguments over
same-sex marriage, (2) changes in the legal approach to asset and income
distribution at divorce, (3) changes in child-support orders and enforcement, (4)
the new constitutional status of paternity, (5) child custody, (6) welfare reform
and its posture toward single motherhood, and (7) the constitutional cases

79. Carbone tells us elsewhere that paternal prerogatives used to include a right to kill one's children
as a matter of discipline. See id. at 218-19. This is not quite the state interventionist model of today.
Moreover, in her history of the English family, Carbone tracks the change from a utilitarian concept of
children-one in which children are to bring financial support to the family-to a more affectionate and
emotional concept that coincided with the rise of the Victorian family. Id. at 156-57.
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dealing with family autonomy over parenting decisions. As before, her alternative commitments are in evidence, though not explicitly.
1. Same-Sex Marriage
Carbone wants the same-sex marriage debate to show us how little we
understand the legal purposes of marriage. The same-sex marriage debate does
not tell us what marriage is, it simply tells us what marriage is not. Carbone
introduces the Hawaii same-sex marriage case, Baehr v. Lewin, 80 in which the
Supreme Court of Hawaii declared that the ban on same-sex marriage was a
denial of equal protection under a provision in the state constitution that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. The court remanded the case to
the lower state court to allow the government to attempt to produce a compelling justification for the sex discrimination.81 Carbone then poses the question
that has mystified many: How does a state articulate grounds for opposing
same-sex marriage? 82 The idea here is that we might discern the function of
marriage from its dependence on heterosexuality. But the unstated purpose of
Carbone's chapter here seems to be to illustrate one of her themes-that moral
arguments are mystifyingly quaint and irrelevant to real policy.
Carbone canvasses the key moral and theological perspectives on the issue,
from Immanuel Kant 83 to today's John Finnis. 84 But she lets Fred Parrella, 85 a
Christian theologian, speak first. He argues that because companionship, and
not solely procreation, has become a legitimate purpose of marriage, the ban on
same-sex marriage makes no sense from a religious perspective. Carbone is
reminding us of the historical materials on the evolution of marriage, from a
purely utilitarian institution to one based in "sentiment" and with significant
emotional and companionate features.
Carbone, through Parrella, tells us that there are three main objections to
same-sex marriage: (1) the Bible, on some readings, forbids sodomy; (2) it has
been traditionally regarded as unnatural and immoral; and (3) in Catholic
teaching, sexual activity must always be open to procreation. It is obvious why
Hawaii might have found it difficult to construct decent secular state interests
80. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
81. Id. at 74.
82. This question was exceptionally difficult in Baehr because the earlier constitutional ruling placed
a burden on the state to produce a compelling reason, not just a rational one, to ban same-sex marriage.
83. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1887). Kant objects to one person using another. Thus,
for Kant, sex is only alright when it is monogamous, within marriage, and engaged in for "more than
the satisfaction of physical desire." Id. at 138. That speaks to some natural law notions of the purpose
of marriage, but it does not explicitly address the opposite-sex mandate.
84. For Finnis, the companionate goals of marriage are entwined with the procreative goals. See
John M. Finmis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation",69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994). Finnis
presents a theological argument, but it has some natural law overtones, and so some have tried to give it
persuasive secular, and therefore, legal force.
85. Parrella participated in a symposium on the subject at Santa Clara University, where Carbone
teaches, and it is to this presentation that she refers. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 135 (describing a Santa
Clara University panel where Parella articulated his views on marriage).
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based on this material. The claim would have to include a morality component,
and that would have to be stripped of religious content.
Carbone is in effect arguing that companionship has been so legitimated as a
function of marriage, that argument for exclusion of same-sex couples is
weakened. In fact, Hawaii chose to argue only that the same-sex marriage ban
promoted procreation within marriage, and thus child welfare. The reason was
rejected easily by the Hawaii Supreme Court. What Carbone wants us to see for
her larger argument is how thoroughly we have reached "the final separation of
marriage, sex, and procreation as bearing any necessary legal relationship to
each other.",86 Carbone's aim in this discussion is to elucidate two points: (1)
strictly moral arguments are ineffectual; and (2) the one remaining legitimate
goal of state policy toward the family is child welfare. If a reader knew nothing
about this topic, she might almost think from Carbone's presentation of it that
when the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the state's attempt to justify the ban
on same-sex marriage, the ban was effectively removed from American law.
Because we know it was not, a better accounting for its resilience is needed than
the one Carbone gives.
This is the least satisfying chapter on legal doctrine. Carbone uses the
same-sex marriage debate primarily to show the extent to which the State has
completely withdrawn from the regulation of marriage. She argues that marriage no longer serves to police sexuality (with extramarital sexuality now
accepted), link biological parents to their children (the biological paternity cases
and the illegitimacy cases), or ensure that women have lifelong protection (no-fault
divorce).87 But making the first two arguments, at least, requires viewing the
same-sex marriage ban solely in terms of what marriage is not, rather than in
terms of what it is. Carbone ignores the implication of the ban: Marriage clearly
does police sexuality. If it no longer polices monogamy, it does police nonheterosexual activity. In addition, the severing of the link between marriage and
the legal protection of relationships to children would come as news to many
same-sex parents. The link seems real to many same-sex parents who feel at
risk in their legal ties to their children based on their inability to marry.
If moral argument were as ineffective as Carbone has suggested throughout
the book, the ban on same-sex marriage would be gone. All evidence so far is
that the moral reasoning is highly effective at preventing same-sex marriage
from achieving legal recognition. Consider the recent events in Vermont, where
the state legislature apparently resisted same-sex marriage so much that it
created an institution virtually identical in all respects except that it is not
"marriage," whatever that means. This suggests that some version of moral
argument has been highly persuasive there. Perhaps Carbone thinks that the
same-sex marriage ban will go the way of shotgun marriages and fault-based
divorce; it will fall away from us over the next several decades despite the
86. Id. at 141.
87. Id. at 142-43.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:923

clamor of moral argumentation because it is unsupported by any practical
purpose; and because opinion and sentiment will again follow social practices,
not lead them. I hope this is so, but I do not think that the sheer irrationality of
the same-sex marriage ban puts the ban to rest quite as easily as Carbone seems
to think; the ban appears to be highly resilient despite its irrationality. It would
seem that any larger thesis about marriage withering on the vine, both in terms
of the number of people who are married and the state's retreat from giving
content to marriage, must contend in a richer way with the fierce resistance to
same-sex marriage. In her quickness to show that moral arguments do not make
sense on this topic, she has failed to acknowledge that they are nonetheless
effective. This dissonance between whether the moral argument is good and
whether it is effective shows exactly how Carbone conceals her normative
arguments: She frames bad arguments as ineffective ones. Here, though, a
normatively bad argument is in fact effective, undermining her attempt to
dispense with moral exhortation on the basis of data showing its irrelevance,
rather than on its own terms.
Moreover, Carbone makes a key leap at the end of this chapter. She is, of
course, happy to have her thesis that child welfare is the only legitimate interest
in marriage vindicated by the state of Hawaii. She then notes: "The question the
court did not address was whether there continued to be a causal connection
between the regulation of the relationship between parents in any form and the
protection of children's interests., 8 8 While this is posited as a question, it is the
way Carbone argues; she is circumspect in the presentation of her ideas. I read
this question as being answered by Carbone: There is no link between child
welfare and the regulation of adult relationships-Fineman's point. Carbone
does not, however, show that there is no link, any more than Hawaii shows that
there is one. I think there may be a link between adult relationships and child
welfare still (although not one that disfavors same-sex relationships), and I will
make that argument directly in Part II.c.
2. Money, Divorce, and the Partnership Theory of Marriage
Carbone notes that divorce courts, which in recent decades had accepted a
partnership theory of marriage marked by the assumption that both spouses
contributed equal value to the marriage, are now retreating from that theory. 89
The partnership ideal that Carbone describes is one where a court divides assets
and income equally upon divorce or separation, despite one spouse's (ordinarily
husband's) ownership, because the court views the marriage itself as an equal
sharing enterprise. Income is distinct from the division of assets, as assets only
reflect what has been accumulated during the marriage itself. Future income
represents the return on the investment each spouse has made in the higher
earner's earning capacity. The partnership theory of marriage can include the
88. Id. at 143.
89. Id. at 144-53.
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idea that future earning capacity should be split because the spouses have been
partners in the common endeavor of marriage. Assets should be divided equally
as well, on the theory that the efforts of the marital partners, even where
asymmetric, are of equal value.
The alternative we have in the 1990s is the clean break: Assets may be
divided, but future income (alimony) should go with the earner, even if short
transition alimony is allowable. The other spouse's (wife's) claim to those
earnings must be based in her actual contribution to the high-earner spouse's
earning capacity, not on the theory that they are partners. Carbone claims that
this shift is happening but her proofs are ambiguous. First, she uses two cases of
extremely wealthy families to illustrate her point: one of the Burrs 9° in 1843,
and the next of the Wendts 9 ' in the 1990s (with assets somewhere between two
and two-hundred million dollars). A court in 1843, in giving a generous alimony
award to Sarah Burr, accepted the argument that she was an equal partner in the
marital endeavor. However, in the 1990s, a Connecticut court in the Wendt case
refused to give Lorna Wendt the benefit of a presumption of equal contribution,
requiring her instead to prove her contribution. Carbone's argument is that
developments that have strengthened women's market position as wage laborers
and thus given women the ability to leave marriages have also undercut the
equal partnership claim.
Most states now do use a presumption in favor of equal division of assets,
and that is a modem development. To make her point that courts are retreating
from partnership theory, Carbone needs to deal with that trend. The Burrs and
the Wendts are atypical, as Carbone knows. Carbone identifies why they make
good examples: They are distinct from typical fifty-fifty divides, where assets
are so middle class in size that anything different would negatively impact one
spouse's standard of living relative to the other. With these abnormally affluent
cases, the fifty-fifty divide is not needed to maintain the wife's standard of
living or sense of wealth. Rather, it would be a straight matter of principle:
There is more than either of them need or could even use, but the surplus should
nevertheless be divided. She is right that these cases do nicely delineate the
difference between getting enough in terms of need or ability to spend and equal
division. But their treatment, particularly that of the Wendt case, may not
represent the legal system's true response to partnership theory. First, Connecticut was unusual in that it did not begin with a fifty-fifty presumption; the case
may have come out differently in another state. Second, the case came out very
well for Lorna Wendt, who received a large award, maybe almost half of the
estate, if not on an equal division theory (the total value of the estate is in
dispute). But finally, maybe courts simply cannot get their minds around the
distribution of that amount of wealth in a coherent, principled way-that would

90. Id. at 144.
91. Id. at 147.
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not distinguish the courts from many other intelligent people trying to figure out
what a truly extraordinary case like the Wendts' might say about marriage.
Carbone does not fully flesh out her intriguing claim that women's increased
earning capacity has undermined their partnership claim upon divorce, but there
seems to be something to it. It seems to be, in part, a result of clean-break
ideology, which asks for a quick winding up of post-divorce financial ties
(alimony). I believe Carbone is arguing that it would not have been possible for
that ideology to develop if women did not have a decent alternative for
post-divorce support: their own wage labor. Second, recognition that domestic
labor is just that-labor-perversely invited its precise valuation, which did not
reach the fifty-fifty level in the Wendt case. Most significantly, women's freedom to leave marriage also limited the term of the partnership to the years the
marriage persisted. Carbone cites Ann Laquer Estin,92 who has argued that
courts are far more generous with long-term marriages than with short ones,
even though in short ones with children, the wife's earning capacity sacrifices
that also affect the long-term marriage have often been made already. Estin
argues that self-reliance norms outweigh any public interest in protecting the
caregiving role.
Carbone is trying to say, descriptively, that the obligation between partners is
withering, which supports her descriptive claim that the only obligations left are
the ones to children. So she finishes this chapter with the observation that the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which strongly favors selfreliance and the clean-break theory, said that the only obligation that should
survive divorce is the obligation to children.93 Once again, Carbone's normative
and descriptive claims seem to mesh. She does not quite make the normative
endorsement of the Wendt court's rejection of a partnership theory, in part
because she undoubtedly agrees with Estin that such an approach undermines
investment in the care of children. But she does seem to feel vindicated by the
UMDA's agreement with her general thesis: Obligations to children are stronger
than those between adults.
3. Child Support
The changes over the past several decades in child support standards and
enforcement strongly back Carbone's argument that society has reoriented its
sense of obligation from partners to parents. There was a time as recently as the
nineteenth century when society conceived of children as obliged to support

parents more than the reverse, in the sense that parents were entitled to
children's wages, and children were obliged to support aging parents.9 4 Parents

92. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance,Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 721, 750-54 (1993).
93. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 153.
94. Some states retain infrequently used statutes obliging children to care for indigent parents. See,
e.g., Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566 (S.D. 1994).
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contributed to their children's upbringing in a reciprocal relationship, with the
expectation of receiving those benefits. Therefore, a parent not living with a
child and receiving those benefits-a parent without the prerogatives of complete parental authority-had no obligation to support a child.9 5
Technically, legal obligations to support began in the Progressive era. But
protection of the public coffers, in the form of reduction in poverty supports,
drove the new laws. Child support enforcement did not begin in earnest until the
expansion in the use of AFDC that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, and for the
same reason-to protect the taxpayers' welfare dollars. Congress took its first
serious action in the area in 1975, creating the Office of Child Support Enforcement, which sought to recover from absent fathers amounts paid out on behalf
of their children in welfare payments. This renewed interest in child support
expanded into the middle class soon thereafter, as the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act emphasized the importance of post-divorce child support orders,
and the number of those orders increased dramatically. The amounts were
highly discretionary, however, and the awards erratic. Throughout the 1980s and
1990s, however, states adopted formalized guidelines that would remove much
of the discretion from child support orders, in large
part in response to federal
96
regulations that gave incentives for states to do SO.
The real thrust of Carbone's argument is that the child support obligation has
become fixed and absolute under legal standards. It is an obligation that does
not rest on the consent of the obligor parent. It carries with it no reciprocal
rights in terms of access to or authority over the child. It is owed regardless of
the obligor parent's other familial burdens, or of any misconduct by the other
parent, no matter how egregious. The last point Carbone ably demonstrates by
reference to two kinds of cases. The first is the case of a woman who lies to a
sexual partner about her use of contraception. His obligation is absolute despite
her misrepresentation. The second is the so-called babysitter case. This case
comes in several variations, but the important facts are that the father is himself
a teenager, the mother is an adult-maybe his babysitter, and she seduced him
in the sense that he was below the age of consent to sexual activity. In other'
words, he is a victim of statutory rape. If ever there seemed a case where the
mother's conduct and the father's compromised consent might be relevant to his
parental obligation, this would be it. 97 The fact that he is still obliged to his
child, on the theory of the child's total innocence, illustrates the extent of our
willingness to consider the parental obligation to be both absolute and entirely
independent of the relationship between the parents. Where marital obligations
once indirectly protected a child's interests, and where marital obligation is now

95. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 157.
96. Id. at 156-59. Carbone provides some details on the debate over how the amounts should be
determined, but they are not important to her point. See id.
97. Id. at 160-61.
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gone descriptively and normatively from the culture, a new structure of direct
obligation to the child has moved into place.
Carbone thus argues that the new regime allows women to engage in nonmarital sex on the same terms as men, but does not enforce her promise to use
contraception. The old regime allowed women to engage in nonmarital sex with
a promise from the man to marry in the event of a pregnancy (the shotgun
marriage). His promise was also unenforceable. The public discourse is for the
most part resoundingly behind this development. There is occasional dissent
from fathers' rights groups, who want rights to accompany the responsibility,
and from Martha Fineman, who thinks child support simply links mothers to
fathers in a replica of the nuclear family, where state support should allow
mothers to be independent of fathers. But by and large Carbone is right: This
transfer of obligation from the consensual marital one to the nonconsensual
parent-child one is complete.
4. Paternity: The Remaking of Fatherhood
The increase in paternal rights in relation to nonmarital children has been as
dramatic as the increase in paternal responsibilities through child support
obligations. The Supreme Court decided a case in 1972, Stanley v. Illinois,98

that significantly changed the course of legal paternity in American law and
spawned a series of follow-on cases completing the transformation. Stanley
lived with his biological children and their biological mother, but the two adults
were not married. When the mother died, the state removed the children and
made them available for adoption because they had no legally recognized
surviving parent. Under state law, Stanley-as a nonmarital father-stood in the
same relation to that adoption that a stranger would, despite having raised his
children. The Supreme Court struck down that law, and recognized a constitutionally protected due process interest that fathers have in their children. The
contours of that right would be hashed out over the course of a handful of other
cases. 99 It would turn out that biology alone is not enough to make a man a
"father" for the purpose of invoking that constitutional protection. He must also
do something affirmatively to show involvement with the child or a willingness
to take responsibility for the child. 1°° His past relationship with an older child
will suffice, if substantial, to create the due process interest. For the newborn, he
probably still needs to do something affirmative, like offer to support the mother
financially or live with her. But the states must give him an opportunity to do
something affirmative that is not dependent on the mother's consent to his

98. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
99. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989);
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
100. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
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involvement, such as register himself with a paternity registry, that will suffice
as his affirmative step.' 0
In response to the Supreme Court cases, states have all, to some degree,
separated the father's relationship to his child from his relationship to the
child's mother. Carbone illustrates this most poignantly with a Florida court's
attempts to deal with the claim of a father who was himself a convicted rapist
who had physically beaten and abused the mother during her pregnancy. 10 2 The
Court struggled with its obligation to disentangle the relationship between the
adults from the parent-child relationship and consider his conduct toward and
surrounding the child alone as relevant to his rights. In the end, his damage to
the mother's health during her pregnancy was considered relevant to the
treatment of the child, if only because the health of the mother and the child
were intertwined at that point. Thus Carbone points out, parent-child relations
are taking over the role marriage used to play in establishing lines of responsibilities and rights. As a matter of positive law, this is the very transformation that
Carbone is describing with her partner-to-parents thesis.
5. Child Custody
Carbone calls this "ground zero" in the gender wars, though the gender wars
are not ostensibly the primary focus of this book. She catalogs the historical
moves from the presumption that fathers get custody, to the presumption that
mothers get custody, and now to the apparent middle, joint custody, which has,
with some caveats, become the prevailing ideal. Right now, there are two fairly
clear positions on child custody. The first argues that children's well-being rests
with continuing meaningful relationships with both parents, and the other that
children's well-being rests with the well-being of the parent who assumes the
majority of responsibility for them. The former group favors joint custody,
liberal visitation, and restrictions on the ability of custodial parents to relocate if
it would interfere with the other parent's contact with the child. The latter group
prefers primary care-taking presumptions, liberal rights to move for custodial
03
parents, and consideration of domestic violence in custody determinations.1
Carbone argues that today's custody laws represent the recognition of perma-

101. Id. at 263-64. Thus, Carbone rightly concludes, several different positions on the meaning of
paternity have developed. First, fatherhood-like motherhood-is biological, and a father has to do
something like abandonment to affirmatively forfeit the right. This is the law in several states. Second,
fatherhood-like motherhood-is dependent on affirmative acts to care for a child (which women
demonstrate when they decide to carry a pregnancy to term). Third, fatherhood and motherhood are
complementary but different. States split amongst these various approaches, with a constitutional
requirement only to provide a father due process when he has done something affirmative to demonstrate his commitment to the child. Carbone canvasses the various debates about whether fathering
should be as involved as mothering to obtain rights, whether the key element is paternal nurturance, or
whether, for example, fatherhood has different qualities than motherhood, with deep involvement
nonetheless.
102. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
103. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 180.
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nent ties between parents and children without the requirement that the parents
stay together in marriage.
Joint custody burst onto the scenes in the late 1970s, with a string of statutes
authorizing it in some cases, and some statutes expressing a preference for it. It
was extremely popular for some time. However, some states backed away from
it somewhat, as the returns have begun to come in. The group that disfavors
joint custody believes that in practice, equally shared responsibility for a child is
rare. Joint custody, on this view, secures for the secondary parent the ability to
interfere with the custodial parent's life by preventing relocation, it secures
rights to see the child and to weigh in on decisions about the child, but it does
not require taking equal responsibility for the child. It confers rights on the
secondary parent without responsibility.' 0 4 There is considerable data to back
the suggestion that joint custody orders, which superficially call for equal
parenting, in practice have a child living most of the time with one parent, and
the other parent enjoying liberal visitation. Carbone presents this evidence in
some detail. 0 5 Moreover, joint custody may provide opportunities for a secondary parent to negotiate a reduction in child support payments, or even financial
settlements related to the adult relations in exchange for backing away from
equal sharing.' 0 6 Though some early feminists advocated joint custody as a
mechanism for creating joint responsibility, 0 7 later feminists have recognized
the difficulty of engendering responsibility through rights. 0 8 After a period of
restricting relocation possibilities for parents with joint custody, we have recently seen some relaxation of relocation restrictions, as courts have come to
better appreciate the imposition on parents with primary responsibility imposed
by the restrictions.' 0 9
With the demise of no-fault divorce, there is no opportunity for spouses to
vindicate their perspectives on the adult conflict leading to divorce through a
court determination that one spouse had wronged the other and provided fault
grounds for divorce. Carbone notes that after no-fault divorce, "the custody
determination carries the full symbolic and practical weight of the adults'
conflict." With domestic violence and family desertion relevant to custody
determinations, custody becomes a moral judgment in the divorce process. This
is a wonderful insight about an effect of the consequences of the partners-toparents shift.

104. Cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293, 314-15 (1989).
105. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 184-86.

106. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 964-65 (1979).
107. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism, and the
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986).

108. See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor ParentalEquality,
38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991).
109. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 189.

2001]

ACCOUNTING FOR FAMILY CHANGE

6. Welfare Reform
This discussion turns out to be far more normative than most of the prior
doctrinal ones. Carbone notes, uncontroversially, that leaving morality issues
aside, "single parenthood becomes viable only if the caretaker can secure a
source of support outside marriage-from her family, the state, the father, or her
own wages."" She then asks whether there will be a new ethic that is
permissive of single parenthood, and on what terms. This may be a moment
when she is simply signaling that the law and culture are in transition, but it
appears to be a normative endorsement of some terms on which single parenthood is supported. In particular, Carbone will favor maternal employment
combined with greater social supports for children. She will not make a
complete case for this particular scheme, though we might infer that the case
includes a sense that this is where we are going descriptively, and a general
endorsement of the choices that are made possible for women by their wage
labor.
Carbone canvasses the welfare reform efforts of the 1990s. Noting that
poverty programs ordinarily have more to do with spelling out and enforcing
community norms than they do with actual relief from suffering,"' she goes on
to investigate the norms spelled out through the 1990s reforms. She observes
that a new consensus arose that AFDC was subsidizing children who should
never have been born in the first place: conservatives arguing that the mother
should have practiced chastity, and liberals that she should have sought an
abortion. Also, with massive movement of middle-class women into the labor
market, the support for a model that included women at home with their
children no longer reflected the prevailing values of the culture: AFDC seemed
to endorse domesticity for poor women, and wage labor for middle-class
women.
This leads Carbone into a moment of full normativity: We need to remake a
new model of mothering that has mothers in the paid labor force. This has hope
for building a coalition among middle-class and low-income women, as both
groups will support building an infrastructure that supports children of working
parents. Carbone thus resolves the middle-class mommy wars between stay-athome and employed mothers by reference to the standard the society is now
setting for low-income mothers. She does not refer to any resistance this plan
might meet amongst middle-class mothers who limit their careers through
part-time work, or stay out of the paid labor force entirely.
7. Child, State, and Teenagers
Perhaps because it comes last, this topic appears to be where Carbone's
argument comes to rest. She reviews the constellation of cases-Meyer v.

110. Id.at 195.
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Nebraska,"12 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,13 and Wisconsin v. Yoder 14 -that
appear to create an autonomous space for parents to make decisions about their
children independent of societal concerns. But she then notes an important
historical aspect of these cases. The Victorian family did have a "thick wall of
protection" between children and society, as parents sheltered their children
from the outside world through intensive maternal supervision, coupled with
absolute parental authority. By the time that the first family autonomy case was
decided, however, society had already begun to encroach on that family privacy.
Carbone argues that the relationship between family and society began to
transform toward the end of the nineteenth century, such that a societal interest
in children independent of their value to their parents emerged. Numerous
factors account for this shift. Industrialization's increased demand for skilled
laborers gave business a stake in education. The populist movement saw public
education as a mechanism for equalizing opportunity. Progressive reformers
liked the Victorian notion of a sheltered and well-nurtured childhood and
wished to extend its benefits beyond the middle class to immigrant and lowincome communities. 1 5 It was against a background of this increasing public
interest in children that the family autonomy cases were raised, and Carbone
says that Meyers and Pierce were "anachronistic at the time [they] were
decided""1 6 -by the 1920s, children were already becoming an increasingly
important public concern." 17
For Carbone, the important issue is the relationship between society and
parents in providing for children's needs. Carbone thinks the most important
case in this line is actually Reno v. ACLU,' 18 a case dealing with a law intended
to restrict children's access to online pornography by restricting online pornography for everyone. The government argued it could regulate to protect children,
noting that past decisions on the regulation of obscenity had distinguished
between adult regulation and child regulation. The Court in Reno responded by
saying that in past cases, "we relied not only on the State's independent interest
in the well-being of its youth, but also on our consistent recognition of the
principle that 'the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.' ,,119 The
Court preferred restrictions that allowed parental control over children's internet
access to restrictions that made the internet "safe" for children.
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Carbone sees this position replayed in the debates over indecent materials
available in public libraries: Should libraries censor all obscene materials that
children might access, or instead try to enact each individual parent's preference
with respect to what her child might be allowed to access? In both cases, the
question is whether there can be a government norm for what is acceptable for
kids, or whether parents always have the prerogative. Carbone argues that we
need to see the library debate differently by seeing the role of the library
differently: The library is where young adolescents, too old for after-school
programs and too young to be home alone, go after school until their parents
finish work. In other words, the library is the community care structure. On this
view, children of this age are not buffered from society at all, and that greatly
distinguishes them from their Victorian counterparts. Carbone sees it as ridicuas the
lous to talk about parental authority over obscene materials in libraries,
120
unavailable.
are
parents
their
because
precisely
library
the
kids are at
And then Carbone gives what suddenly seems to be the main thrust of her
book: We no longer provide adolescents with a buffer from society at large in
the form of the private family. We must, therefore, either give them the tools to
deal with society at large, or create safer community-based spaces for them that
provide the buffer no longer available in the family. This is her move toward
building a new relationship between children and society-building an infrastructure that supports working parents and also supports their children and the very
concept of childhood for older children.
D. CARBONE'S CONCLUSION: IT'S ALL ABOUT GENDER

Suddenly, from all the doctrinal description and empirical information, a
normative position has become clear. We have had two transformations, the
change in the terms of adult relationships, and then the change in the obligations
and rights in the parent-child relationships. But we have not achieved much
progress toward the third transformation-setting new terms between families
and the state, and to a certain extent between parents, that will make effective,
successful parenting in the new structure possible. Here, we see the question of
libraries, functioning as after-school programs, deciding whether the library or
the parent should monitor the content children receive on the internet, as
emblematic of that third transformation. Carbone wants something specific from
that third transformation: better community support for parenting and for children.
Carbone argues that the most difficult issues will arise in this third transformation. It is pretty hard to measure that claim, given, how hard some of the past
transformations have been. But her grounds for claiming that this transformation contains the difficult issues are as follows: (1) we are in the midst of the
process; (2) the critical issues combine the normative with the descriptive; and

120. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 222-25.
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21
(3) the re-negotiation takes place along the fault lines of class and gender.'
These three points turn out to be the keys to Carbone's normative positions as
well as her descriptive ones.
Carbone's conclusion turns all of this prior analysis with full critical force on
the question of gender. She argues that Becker and Fineman, to whom she could
also have added Okin, agree implicitly that there is a male premium: a benefit
conferred for being male that historically arose from the concentration of
property in male hands. Women in the nineteenth century gained a little
bargaining power through the Married Women's Property Acts and community
property systems in states like California, and there was a corresponding
increase in family instability. Today's economic reorganization, which has
drawn more women into the paid labor market, has given women another boost
in bargaining power, apparently destabilizing marriage further. In the nineteenth
century, couples adjusted to the new distribution of power and found a new
equilibrium where women shared greater power.' 2 2 Carbone suggests that such
a transformation is again underway. She cites recent studies about marital
longevity that suggest that a key determinant is men's willingness to allow their
wives' influence in the relationship. Women initiate seventy percent of all
divorces today, particularly in cases where men do not accept women's greater
influence. 123 Balance of power in relationships turns out to be key; women are
gaining more through paid work, and theorists like Fineman would increase that
bargaining power further by giving women more control over fathers' access to
children, and better financial independence.
To those, like Galston, who advocate marriage, Carbone asks: On what
terms? Galston never quite investigates the degree of coercion he would be
willing to tolerate to produce two-parent families. Carbone seems cautiously
optimistic that new terms of partnership are being worked out, as she notes that
the choices are between new and better shared terms, or more single parenthood. At first, Carbone appears not to love Fineman's indifference toward the
role of fathers. She prefers "supportive partnerships," ones that allow fathers an
important role, but that still look a bit like Fineman's: The terms of paternal
involvement are paternal conduct that is acceptable to mothers. Somehow
Carbone's idea comes out sounding less radical than Fineman's, but the point is
the same-increase women's bargaining power and men will need to cede
power to women to maintain partnerships, and to achieve cooperative parenting.
Carbone is also a bit evasive about the level of coercion she is willing to
tolerate; she says the "question then becomes how to encourage mutually
respective and supportive relationships in a system powerless to impose them
directly." 124 She offers a few ideas, such as creating greater ability to manage
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conflict in relationships, that are nice but a bit vague. Carbone does not quite
say what her bottom line is on mothers' ability to exclude unacceptable fathers,
but she does say that the adults must be able to achieve "at least enough
' 25
Ulticooperation with a parental partner to secure the child's well-being."'
mately, she seems to be hoping for a change in sentiment, that elusive concept,
that will run along gender-egalitarian lines. Carbone has been wary all along of
whether policy can change sentiment, and nothing in her conclusion indicates
that she has changed her mind.
However, when it comes to the final transformation, the one between family
and state, she envisions more opportunity for intervention. She sees two main
focal points of that evolution. The first is state aid for struggling families. New
poverty support programs include aggressive state intervention in collecting
child support and discouraging teen pregnancy. Carbone ambiguously notes that
these efforts have been successful; but is that descriptive claim an endorsement
normatively? The second focal point is what appears to be Carbone's pet issue:
the interaction between the state and teenagers. Here she advocates rebuilding
community structures that help children transition into adulthood. This is a
vague proposal, though certainly a starting point for discussion. And with that,
she ends her rich and wonderful book.
II. TENSIONS IN CARBONE'S WORK
A.

MORALITY ARGUMENTS, SENTIMENT, AND DATA

How does one untangle Carbone's use of data to defuse ideological argument,
which she calls moral argument, from her use of data to make ideological
argument? And how does one square Carbone's position that moral argument is
not simply wrong, but irrelevant to family evolution, with her argument that
changes in sentiment are both the most difficult changes to trace, and yet the
most significant determinants of change? Carbone's monograph is a wonderful
artifact of the difficult relationship among these issues.
First, consider how Carbone uses the concept of "sentiment." She introduces
it several times. First, she discusses it through Lawrence Stone, who tells us that
we cannot explain how the family became an affectionate and private entity by
making that change a part of the economic change to industrialization. Stone
says that attitudes toward marriage-"sentiment" in favor of affective individualism-preceded industrialization. Sentiment then, does several things for Carbone. First, it questions, or at least complicates, the link between economic
changes and family ideology. She walks us through so much description of the
interaction between economic conditions and family changes that she cannot
mean to argue that economic conditions are irrelevant. Rather, she means to
argue that their predictive power is limited by sentiment. That is to say,
economics will have critical effects, but when economics interacts with senti125. Id. at 237.
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ment and attitude, that critical effect will not itself have been predictable,
because the straight economic effect predicted will have been thrown off by
attitude. This can be used, then, to argue that government attempts to intervene
in the economic incentives surrounding family practices will not hit their mark,
as they will not have been able to adjust for the unpredictable effec.t of
sentiment. Surprisingly, she does not cite the literature on social norms, to
which this insight is highly relevant.1 2 6 However, social norms theorists should
love this book, as it ably illustrates the mediating power of attitude on economics.
The further benefit that Stone's sentiment argument gives to Carbone is in the
claim that we cannot, or no one has effectively, accounted for change in
sentiment. Her choice of Milton Regan as elucidator of the most recent shifts in
sentiment about the family does nothing to disturb this mystery, as he does not
organize his work as an historical exploration of cause. In other words, not only
will sentiment interfere with future social planning, but to date, we cannot even
say much about how sentiment came to change during other periods in history.
Sentiment, then, becomes both all important and a mysterious wildcard at the
same time. This further supports her sense that we could not possibly effectively
intervene to change family structure, as change in the key determinant of family
structure is inaccessible analytically. She thus has flagged the significance of
sentiment, but does not resolve the issues it raises.
She turns around to use this sentiment point at least twice. First, her general
arguments about changes in the economy and changes in women's economic
power relative to men's might lead one to the following conclusion: Marriages
are breaking down at this moment because the terms are in the process of being
renegotiated, just as they were during the late nineteenth century. However, this
effect will be smoothed out as more egalitarian expectations for marriage
become the norm, and more marriage will then be contracted, on different and
better terms for women. That is because marriage still benefits men, and will do
so even if it is a little less beneficial to them than it used to be, and it will benefit
women more on the new terms. This is a good thing, Carbone and others would
argue, because it will be better for women and children to have stable support
from fathers. However, Carbone cautions, African-American women gained
greater economic power relative to African-American men over the course of
the twentieth century. Rather than recreating marriage on more egalitarian
terms, the marriage rate among African Americans has simply declined, with
single mothering the new norm. That, Carbone says, is because the prediction
that new and egalitarian terms of marriage will emerge depends on changing
men's and women's expectations of marriage and gender ideologies, and those

. 126. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 968-72,
1019-25 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MiCH.
L. REv. 338, 342 (1997); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1697, 1717-18 (1996).
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are the long version of "sentiment." They, it seems, are not simply a product of
economic bargaining power. Adding them to the mix leaves us unable to predict
what the consequences of the current blip of marital instability will lead to.
Yet Carbone also delivers us Stephanie Coontz, who argues that nonmarital
sexual activity increased in the 1950s, before its increase became ideologically
acceptable. When that activity led to pregnancy, it also led to marriages that
were not as stable as those of prior generations. Thus it led to an increase in
divorce rates, which again preceded the new acceptance of divorce. Finally,
women began entering the paid labor force in greater numbers steadily after
World War II, again, before the change in sentiment favoring women's equality
in the workplace. Coontz appears to be making the straightforward point that
reason follows custom-moral opinion changes in response to changes in actual
practices-and incorporates those changed practices into new morality. I be-

lieve Carbone wishes this to be a point about moral argumentation, not about
sentiment; that is, moral argumentation does not change behavior. Instead,
behavior moves along of its own accord, and eventually changes moral argumentation. But it is a subtle line between moral argument and sentiment. If they are
the same thing, it appears that Coontz's account, which Carbone seems to
approve of, does give us our account of changes in sentiment: They follow
social practices. Coontz does not, however, account for changes in social
practices. Women's workforce participation may have to do with economics, but
what of increased sexual activity? Some have argued that was a response to
contraception, but the increase preceded the development of the pill. Maybe it
had something to do with the war, but if so, we would more conventionally
classify that as a cultural and not an economic explanation. My point is simply
that Carbone's explication of sentiment at times presents it to us as mysterious,
but at other times as a logical follow-on to changes in social practice, not a
driver of them.
Which brings us to her treatment of moral argumentation. There is nothing
that Carbone makes more clear through her deluge of data than that a little
moral disapproval here or there will function as a quaint sideshow to the
multiple real material forces driving change. This is the spirit of a good
economist showing through. She says this directly several times-for example,
our purpose is not "one of judgment" because the changes have winners and
losers, 1 27 or there is no evidence that families respond to "moral exhortation." ' 28 She also demonstrates it indirectly by providing detailed accounts of
changes in family behavior that are related to changes in the economy. And she
shows her disdain for moral arguments by choosing as her four theorists people
who also eschew conventional moralistic argumentation.
But I am a bit confused as to the distinction between moral argumentation
and sentiment. Moral argumentation about family form strikes me as expression
127.
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of sentiment. If we cannot figure out how sentiment changes by tracing economic changes (Stone), and sentiment has tremendous power, does not moral
argumentation also defy easy tracing of roots, and affect outcomes? The most
obvious case here is same-sex marriage: Moral argument has so far been highly
successful at denying same-sex partners access to marriage's full symbolic and
practical force.
Finally, there is a strong relationship between her disdain for moralistic
arguments and her use of data. But as I suggested earlier, though data does show
the errors of some moralistic arguments, it can also conceal others that are being
made. Carbone makes her own kind of moral argument, though it is a moral
argument centered on equality, and the value of caring for children. The real
moral argumentation she objects to is conventional conservative moral argumentation: Single mothers are bad, for example, and should have abstained from
premarital sex or should give their babies up for adoption. Like Carbone, I
reject those moralistic claims, and prefer the ones she embraces (equality and
supporting caregiving). But if she is correct that moral argumentation has no
effect as a descriptive matter, than the preference for equality must not either.
And if she is wrong that facts eliminate moral claims, then they eliminate the
moral claims of women and children seeking equality and care as well as the
moral claims of society disapproving of single parenting.
Instead, I think the great contribution of this book is its ability to show the
errors of moral argumentation about the specific issue of single motherhood,
particularly in terms of efficacy. In other words, her broad claims about the
limited effects of moral argument overall do not sit entirely comfortably with
her broad claims about the significance of sentiment. However, to the extent that
Carbone's mission was to defuse the specific claim that public moral disapproval of single motherhood could possibly actually affect its incidence, her
empirical survey of the causes of single motherhood does effectively defuse that
claim. What her tour through the data does is naturalize the progression toward
unstable adult partnerships; it reverses our sense of the baseline, such that we
will better accept the inevitability of unstable adult relationships, and therefore
turn our focus toward providing children with stability using community-based,
not nuclear-family-based, change. In a sense, this is the use of data to make
normative argument, not simply the use of data to defuse it.
B.

THE EFFICACY OF INTERVENTION, THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION

The prior discussion leads to another tension within the book: Carbone makes
it a major mission to question the efficacy of family policy aimed at intervening
to affect the course of family change. At the same time, she makes it a minor
mission to advocate for just such intervention.
With regard to family form, nonmarital births, and the divorce rate, Carbone
tells us time and again that these changes have been evolving over centuries,
and are influenced by factors beyond our comprehension as they occur, and in
any event with century-long evolutions themselves. Moreover, these changes
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have not been responsive to moral disapproval of them, nor to punitive sanctions against those who represent the cutting edge. She repeatedly cautions that
we must be careful and humble in our attempts to isolate a single variable, a
single cause of a phenomenon in family change-for example, welfare, male
joblessness, contraception, women's paid labor force participation, the decline
of shotgun marriages. She repeatedly cautions that it is questionable whether
these changes can be influenced by, or have ever been influenced by, conscious
policy intended to get the result it produces. Here, she sounds like the typical
small government advocate: Intervention is ineffective at best, and at worst has
perverse effects and might even hurt those it is intended to help. Her thesis
seems to be questioning whether there is a role for family policy at all. She
proves this point far more than she could possibly have intended, given the
places where she sees a role for intervention.
Carbone says several times that these changes are with us, and at some point,
it is time to stop asking if they are good or bad, and to recognize that there is no
going back. This may be a sly elision of the normative and descriptive: She has
rallied plenty of evidence to support the view. But she also shows no normative
regret, in that sense siding more with Okin and Fineman than Galston or Becker.
Maybe it is time to accept that there is no going back simply because it appears
to be such an unattractive option normatively, particularly for women. Crossculturally, there have been plenty of effective efforts at reversing positive trends
for women in the area of freedom and independence, Afghanistan being a recent
example. It is possibly an unconscious move she makes: As a good liberal and
feminist she is arguing against moral condemnation of family change in general,
but she couches that argument as one about efficacy-it is pointless to moralize
about these changes, they are here to stay.
Which leads to the tension: Carbone favors better community support for
children. She has a few new moral codes she would like to see us embrace,
mostly about better care systems, better codes of cooperative parental responsibility. She does this through a description of the final transformation, the one
rewriting the relationship between children/families and state/community. The
descriptive point is that that relationship is being rewritten-we are to take that
transformation as fact. Yet she is insistent that it is just underway, not far along.
Thus the future of that transformation is uncertain. How is it that we can be
entirely descriptive about a transformation barely underway? Even labeling it as
such assumes change is in the future-assumes something about a time not
ready to be described. And Carbone goes much further: She has an actual hope
for the design of that future. She wants better conflict resolution and cooperation between parents, married or single, and she wants a thicker relationship
between community and child, to fill in and provide a buffer from adulthood in
the absence of parents, who are in the workplace. Hence her turn in the end
toward the question of adolescents: She is clearly of the view that we are
leaving them unsupervised too much, and that in the new world order (the
inevitable one), parents cannot really change that, because they are all working.
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In the unwritten future, the part we apparently can design, the community
would fill in here, providing safe community spaces with some adult presence
where adolescents can spend after-school time.
I agree with Carbone's prescription for a thicker relationship between society
and children, but I do not know how to reconcile it with her sense that
intervention into family change is futile. She seems to want to distinguish
punitive attempts to steer the conduct of individuals from the provision of
support for individuals that simply tracks their choices. A person could make a
case for distinction. For example, perhaps the kind of incentives one would
have to put in place to change marital and fertility behavior would have to
involve a clearly politically unacceptable degree of coercion to overcome the
countereffects of non-government influences. At the same time, perhaps the
support one offers for families whose choices are relatively unresponsive to
government influence, in the way of child care (after school programs and
community centers) simply eases their burdens a bit. It redistributes the burdens
from parents to community, but will not be enough to change parental behavior
by, for example, encouraging more births. On this view, she is saying that we
should wake up to change and adjust to it-try to stay ahead of the game, accept
changes and adapt, somehow without trying to affect those changes. Maybe it is
a distinction between the punitive incentive and support through subsidy. But
after making the case she has about our ability to influence family change, I
wish she had said something to explain why we can effectively intervene on
behalf of children.
I suppose that a big dose of data is always a good antidote for a superficial
moralistic argument, and that may be what Carbone meant to do by giving us so
much. Or perhaps she sees a special role for moral values when a transformation is still at its fledgling stage. Or perhaps her argument is entirely consistent:
You cannot have a government policy that changes individual behavior. Though
macroeconomic changes contribute to the evolution of family norms, individual
financial incentives are ineffective to change behavior. Thus incentives like
welfare do not cause nonmarital births, so cutting welfare will not be an
effective disincentive to nonmarital births. Similarly, support for community
child-rearing will not be an effective incentive to have non-marital children, so
it can be provided safely without concern for its effects on the birthrate. In that
sense, it may be that she wants to explain the changes that have occurred in
terms of major changes in the economy, but if she wants to offer support for
child-rearing, she needs to separate those changes from individualized economic incentives. That is what she has done, if without a satisfying normative
argument.
C.

CAN WE SEPARATE OBLIGATIONS TO CHILDREN FROM ADULT RELATIONSHIPS?

The final tension in Carbone's work is one implicit in the description of a
shift from adult relationships to parent-child relationships as the core of obligation and expectation. At some level, her thesis is hard to argue with, it is so
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descriptively sound. Yet many have argued that it is difficult to separate adult's
interests from children's interests. 129 Indeed, Carbone herself offers much evidence of this point. To the extent Ira Ellman or Ann Laquer Estin are concerned
about caregivers' post-divorce financial status, they are concerned about child
welfare, parenting, and the influence of the adult relationship on it. Even more
clearly, child-custody disputes and child-custody standards engage the difficulty
of disengaging adult lines of obligation from obligations of adults to children.
However a custodial parent frames her need to relocate, her child's welfare is
linked to her well-being. The relocation can be motivated by the custodial
parent's relationship, even if negative, to the other parent. It may be good for
the child to have her custodial parent feeling better; it may be bad for the child
to lose contact with the non-custodial parent. The adult relationship frames the
parent-child one in some sense. Moreover, the lines of obligation and rights
drawn between children and their unmarried parents will always frame the
future of the adult interactions, of which there will be many if the parent-child
relationship is strengthened through law. Seeking child support from an absent
father also forms the basis of a relationship between that father and the child's
mother, as the payment, when not going to reimburse the state for welfare
payments, is going to the mother. There are many more examples, cutting across
almost all family law issues. Carbone herself has noted that morality issues
about adult conduct, no longer legitimately played out in fault determination,
are imposed in full force onto .custody determinations. These entanglements
belie the notion that the relationships can be effectively isolated.
Yet there is clearly some analytical truth to her realignment. The only
question, then, is whether the conceptual reorganization she offers will obscure
important issues that can be better seen when we know the parent-child relationship interacts critically with the parent-parent relationship. I think Martha
Fineman would say that there are issues that can be better seen in this context:
Any time both parents acquire rights or responsibilities with respect to a child,
the state is also placing those parents in some relation to one another, though
this time, often an involuntary one. That affects the well-being of the adults, and
we should keep that cost in mind lest we think we have cleanly excised the adult
relationship from the policy discussion through the partners-to-parents transformation.
D. THE CASE FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION TO CARE FOR CHILDREN

If there is a disappointment in all of this, it is that Carbone never makes an
ordinary normative case for her values: gender equality, freedom to exit bad
situations, and the care of children. Other than the one paragraph where she
makes the straightforward case that children are dependents and therefore
warrant state protection, she leaves us to fill in these values. On gender equality,
129. I have made this argument before. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright, Problems of
Constitutionalizationin Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1139, 1147-51 (1999).
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she may be forgiven, as the case for equality is made by Okin in her text, and
the general principle of equality is broadly understood in the legal community.
As to the normative case for state intervention to support the care of children,
that is a controversial position. Let me set out what I think the case for it might
have looked like, had Carbone offered it.
First, there are a number of people on both sides of the political aisle who
would argue that children are a consumer choice made by parents, selfishly and
30
for their own purposes, and therefore should not be supported by the society.
There are two views from within those taking that position on whether children
should be discouraged. Some would say they should not be discouraged any
more than any other private preference, like simple consumption, as long as the
parent can pay for it, it is value-neutral. There are also some who would make
the argument that raising children should be discouraged. First, there are
environmentalists who see children as a drain on the earth's resources. Second,
and more interesting for Carbone's purposes, are feminists who think that
having children is an impediment to women's self-actualization. The latter
group will be arguing that public support for children at least creates perverse
incentives, even if we should allow people who want them to have and support
them without trying to provide counter-incentives. 131
I would argue that children are a public good. They are the future citizens and
workers for the polity and the economy. Those who take my position must
contend, however, with the argument that parents do not decide to have children
for the good of others, they do it for their own enjoyment. I believe that this is
true, but does not change the fact that children are a public good. Parents do
decide to have children selfishly, using that term in a non-derogatory way.
However, that does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that no one else
benefits from children. Children create positive externalities, a term Carbone
actually uses in her description of Fineman's work. They create these externalities because they do become the future workers and voters for the economy as a
whole.
But why do we care if the economy has future workers? Because without
future workers, our wealth is meaningless-they are needed to fund our social
security accounts, or to make the assets we have in bonds, real estate, or the
stock market retain any value. They fuel the economy that we live off of. Why
not simply let those of us alive now live out our days until there are none of us
left? Though it is possible to conceive of such a world, I see two problems with
it. The first is a matter of gut instinct: I suspect that the drive to reproduce has
some basis deep enough either in biology or our identities to make it difficult to
eradicate altogether. But to a person against public support for children, that

130. See, e.g., ELINOR BuRKErr, THE BABY BOON: How AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS (2000).
131. This has been argued at conferences by Mary Ann Case, and Katherine Franke has just
published an article on the subject, Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001).
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point will not be persuasive. The more persuasive point, I believe, is that that
last generation needs someone to provide the actual physical care that the
elderly need. The alternative being mapped out would leave the last generation
suffering an unusually unpleasant ending. Unless we part with the quality of life
that includes the ability to buy any processed foods or other goods in our old
age, or any other processed comforts, we will need younger workers. Similarly,
we need younger voters to fuel the polity, to provide us at the bare minimum
with security, if not more meaningful civic engagement as we age.
And what about the selfishness claim: If people want to raise children
anyway, why should we fund it, even if in fact it does create a positive
externality? The answer seems to me to be the same as it would be for any
private investment that we might encourage through tax incentives, such as a
cut in the capital gains tax or a local tax benefit for a defense contractor that
brings jobs to a community. We know that the cut in the capital gains tax will
give the most benefit to the taxpayer with the capital gains, but it may also bring
a benefit to the economy when those savings are reinvested. No one actually
imagines that the defense contractor builds a manufacturing facility for the
public good-it does so for its own selfish (using the term neutrally), profitmaximizing good. Yet if it benefits others, we consider it an appropriate place to
discuss public support. So it is with having children: The claim that people do it
selfishly rather than selflessly does not diminish the claim that it is an investment we might publicly support.
The defense of public support for children might also include a discussion of
the negative effects on society of failing to support child-rearing, assuming that
it is neither constitutionally permissible nor practically possible to discourage
births altogether. Those negative effects include crime and poverty, which have
negative side effects for the public, for those who need a persuasive public
reason to care about crime or poverty.
Finally, the defense of public support for child-rearing must tie in to gender
justice, as Fineman demonstrates. If women want children, or if women are
going to have children, then the allocation of labor to the nuclear family often
unfairly burdens women either with unwanted marriages or with poverty. This
argument does assume children's existence, which my prior argument questions.
Nonetheless, I believe there is a decent case for assuming the existence of
children, as reproduction is a practice as deeply rooted in our traditions as death
and eating.
These arguments no doubt need further development. Carbone's book would
have been more satisfying if she had provided this kind of argumentation. Such
an argument would have been the product of embracing the position directly.
Ill.

SOME APPLICATIONS OF CARBONE'S INSIGHTS
A. THE RESTATEMENT OF CHANGE

One of the impressions most powerfully left by Carbone's work is that it is
exceedingly difficult to grasp major trends that are occurring in any nuanced
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way while they are still underway. This is a point about seeing the world in
transition: Not only do we fail to see major changes occurring, we misunderstand what we do see. So, for example, the 1950s model of marriage is close
enough to our own generation that its norms seem to stand for us as a Time One
baseline. But that does not make it an accurate baseline; quite to the contrary.
We will have a distorted impression of change, and of the correlations with that
change, if we view the significant changes as having occurred between 1955
and 1990. They ought to be viewed over the course of the last 150 years at least,
and maybe the last 300 years. Only then will we see larger correlations. From
the 1950s baseline perspective, it looks like women's employment and the
sexual revolution are the major correlating factors serving as candidates for
suspicion about causation. From the 1700 perspective, it is companionate
marriage itself that appears to be the suspicious correlate to instability. There
are some who may still wish to question women's employment and the sexual
revolution, while there are almost none wishing to question companionate
marriage.
There are adjustments we might safely make now that companionate marriage is the norm, however. We can disapprove of arranged marriages, insist on
consent, and condemn domestic violence as a mechanism of discipline. What
adjustments is it safe to make, however, to correlates whose relevance is not
fully understood yet?
The American Law Institute (ALI) has, for the past several years, undertaken
to write "principles" of family law, 132 which were approved this year. They do
not call it a "restatement," as it is clear that it is far more like a uniform code
than like a neutral restatement of the law as has been practiced in the states. In
fact, it is dependent to some degree on future enactments in state legislatures.
Given the amount of change over the past several decades that Carbone ably
canvasses, it is no wonder that a simple restatement would be hard to achieve.
Any statement of the law as it is right now would have to contend with whether
the law has reached any stable equilibrium on the massive changes in family
form and expectation that Carbone has described. Carbone shows the error of
the belief that we can understand changes while they are still happening, and
decries the hubris of intervention. On this view, one might suspect that the
ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution have been under review at a
spectacularly bad time, when family law and life are in the midst of major
transformation, and no one believes that a slowdown in change has arrived.
Moreover, with respect to the Principles' approach to financial distributions
at divorce, there is more trouble still. As Carbone tells us early on, Ira Ellman,
the reporter for this particular subsection of the Principles,takes a normative
position on the theoretical approaches outlined in the beginning of her book. His
view is that Becker has properly characterized the family as functioning well
132. PRINCIPLES OF THE
Final Draft Part I, 1997)
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when specialized. Ellman's belief is that we can only fairly encourage that
specialization if we provide proper financial incentives upon divorce, not
leaving those who specialize in family labor financially vulnerable.1 33 If Carbone has shown us anything, it is that specialization has its perils independent
of dependence, in that it creates gendered power differentials, and foregoes the
possibility of even greater specialization among women in market labor. Declining specialization in the form of non-marital parenting with mothers in the
workplace is rapidly becoming a force to contend with. To encourage specialization, even safe specialization, is to take a position in that debate. Taking a
position seems to be precisely what Carbone thinks is dangerous at such a time.
Individuals are developing strategies for coping with new power arrangements
and new expectations, and the development of those strategies results from such
a complicated intersection of forces that incentives written into divorce law are
not likely to affect behavior at all. State legislatures and judges would do well to
read Carbone's book before making final decisions about implementing the
Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution.
B. CAREGIVING SYSTEMS AND THE VALUE OF CHILDREN

Many scholars have noted the extent to which we have eliminated our system
of providing care for dependents without yet building an alternative infrastructure to do the task.134 Caregiving moved from the village to the nuclear family
with the rise of the Victorian family. With the rise of the full-labor-force family,
we have not yet rebuilt a care infrastructure. This is Carbone's final and
incomplete transformation, and the current vacuum has been discussed by many
others as well. I will not revisit that debate here, 35 but I wish to raise an issue
Carbone's book leaves me wondering about. Carbone tells us that our conception of children changed along with the care system. Before the Victorian
family, children had a more utilitarian function to their parents, and quantity
over quality (educational and emotional investment) was the practice. Community and larger familial structures played a major role in the supervision of
children. With the shift to affective individualism in the Victorian family, the
middle class care structure became privatized, with nuclear families doing their
own care of children. The conception of children shifted when their care
structure shifted. Under the new care structure, children became important
emotionally to their families. The greater investment in children was in part

133. CARBONE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
134. E.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER (1995); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY:
INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS (1999); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES
HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK

CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT? (2000); Lucie White, Quality Child Care for Low-Income
Families, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White
eds., 1999); Deborah Stone, Why We Need a CareMovement, NATION, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13-15.
135. Conceptions of care work will be the subject of a symposium I am guest editing in 77
CHi.-KENr L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
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educational but also in part emotional. The family had become the private
emotional buffer from turmoil in the world at large, so children became a focal
point of emotional life and childhood a distinct concept well into teenage years.
This leaves me wondering how, as our care system will be transformed over
the next half century in ways that Carbone alludes to, or in different ways, will
the conception of children and childhood change with it? The movement of
middle-class women into the workforce, and the burgeoning work-family (now
neutrally called work-life) industry addressed to the tensions created by that
move, have already created enormous controversy around that question. From
child-free advocates like Elinor Burkett, 136 we see children as a private consumption choice made by parents. Following from that view, children and childhood
are not to be subsidized any more than any other selfish consumption activity.
From government documents we hear that children are the future workforce,
and that spending on them is investment in the economy. Following from that
view, we can build a public support structure for care on the theory that money
spent now will be returned to the economy in the form of a more productive
workforce. From employers we hear a message somewhat in tension with that
one, which is that children are a drain on the energies and productivity of
parent-workers, and that care systems should be developed for the purpose of
making parents into more reliable workers with fewer absences and reduced
turnover. From prosecutors we hear that children are potential criminals, that
adolescents are potentially dangerous actors whose collective activities should
be monitored and whose infractions should be punished severely. From this
viewpoint, care structures should include extensive monitoring of adolescent
behavior ranging from drug testing to searches of rooms and lockers to Internet
access restrictions. From environmentalists we hear that children are future
consumers, enemies of the earth's ecosystem, and so efforts to reduce the
birthrate are beneficial, and presumably efforts to support caregiving are counterproductive. From educators we hear that children are future citizens, and that
care structures must be put in place that teach children how to become responsible guardians of the polity. From social workers we hear that children are
innocents to be protected from the hazards of their families and communities at
all cost.
Surely there are more candidates for conceptions of children and childhood. My
point is this: The care infrastructure that will evolve will in part be a response to a
favored conception of children, and it will in part create a favored conception of
children. Carbone's description of the last major transformation in care systems, the
one that placed care responsibilities squarely in the hands of the nuclear family, linked
up with the last change in the conception of childhood. When thinking about the next
care system, we ought to be asking questions not only about the economic activities of
adults and about the allocation of responsibilityfor children, but also about the
meaning of childhood.
136.
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